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REVIEW ESSAY 
THE ART OF JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 
LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE juDGE. By Gerald Gunther. New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1994. Pp. xxi, 818. $35.00. Hard Cover. 
JusTICE LEWis F. PoWELL,jR. By John C. Jeffries, Jr. New York: Charles 
Scriber's Sons. 1994. Pp. xii, 690. $30.00. Hard Cover. 
HuGo BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY. By Rnger K. Newman. New York: Pan-
theon Books. 1994. Pp. xiv, 741. $30.00. Hard Cover. 
Michael J Gerhardtt 
INTRODUCTION 
Judicial biographies, like judicial opinions, are easier to criticize 
than to write. Many complain that judicial biographies oversimplify 
the judicial function or overemphasize important opinions or the lu-
rid aspects ofjudges' personal lives. Others condemnjudicial biogra-
phies for celebrating rather than critically or impartially analyzing 
judges' deeds and decisions. These concerns lead some to doubt 
whether judicial biography is a legitimate genre, especially given the 
absence of any consensus on the criteria for a good judicial biography. 
Also problematic is the lack of agreement over what makes a judge 
great or at least sufficiently worthy to be the subject of a biography. 
The recent publications of three eagerly anticipated judicial biog-
raphies-Gerald Gunther's Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge,1 
John Jeffries' Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,2 and Roger Newman's Hugo 
Black: A Biography-have focused attention not only on what made 
t Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William & Mary; 
Vlsiting Professor, Cornell Law School, 1994-95; B.A Yale University 1978, M.S. The 
London School ofEconomics;J.D. The University of Chicago. I am grateful to the partici-
pants in the faculty workshop at Cornell Law School and especially to Kathy Abrams, Greg 
Alexander, Jill Fisch, George Hay, Robert Kent, Dan Richman, Stewart Schwab, Anthony 
Sebok, Gary Simson, Bill Treanor, Steve Wermiel, and Ron Wright for their helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts; to Tom Redburn and Michael Parker, both of the Cornell Law 
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1 GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE jUDGE (1994). 
2 joHN C.jEFFRIES,jR.,juSTicE LEwis F. PoWEu.,JR. (1994). 
3 ROGER K. NEWMAN, HuGo BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY (1994). 
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each of these judges famous but also on the utility of a judicial biogra-
phy. Each book is special in its own right as the first comprehensive 
biography of its formidable subject,4 each of whom earned his fame 
largely (but not exclusively) as a judge. Justice Black, for instance, 
served with distinction for ten years as a United States senator and for 
over thirty-four years on the Supreme Court.5 Justice Powell was a top-
flight corporate lawyer at a law firm he helped to make one of the 
nation's most prestigious. He was also active in civic and bar-related 
activities.6 For example, he served as President of the American Bar 
Association7 for two years and later was a swing vote on the Supreme 
Court for over fifteen years. 8 Learned Hand was an active federal 
judge for almost five decades. 9 He is reputedly one of the greatest 
judges, if not the most distinguished jurist, never appointed to the 
Supreme Court. 
The three books invite comparisons for many other reasons. 
Although well published in other kinds of legal scholarship, none of 
the three authors is a professional legal historian, raising a question 
about the degree to which they each have met the special demands of 
such projects. The latter challenges become more acute given the 
close ties between each author and his subject. For instance, Gunther 
served as a law clerk to Judge Hand10 and was anointed as Hand's 
official biographer by Felix Frankfurter, who dissuaded Hand from 
burning his personal papers by promising that Gunther would chroni-
cle Hand's life.11 Gunther even concedes at the outset of his book 
that Hand is "my idol still."12 Similarly, Jeffries clerked for Justice 
Powell, who entrusted Jeffries with "his files and his memories" for the 
biography.1s Newman admits that Justice Black is one of his heroes. 
Further, he had the Black family's full support in gaining access to 
4 Justice Black's life, particularly his tenure on the Supreme Court, is the subject of 
numerous books and articles. See, e.g., GERALD T. DuNNE, HuGO BLACK AND THE jUDICIAL 
REvOLUTION (1977); jOHN P. FRANK, MR. jUSTICE BLACK: THE MAN AND HIS OPINIONS 
(1949);jAMESj. MAGEE, MR. jUSTICE BLACK: ABsOLUTIST ON THE CoURT (1980);jAMESF. 
SIMON, THE ANrAGONISTS: HuGo BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN Mon-
ERN AMERICA (1989); William E. Leuchtenburg, A Klansman joins the Court: The Appointment 
of Hugci Lafcryette Black, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1973); Charles A Reich, Mr. justice Black and 
the Living Constitution, 76 HARv. L. REv. 673 (1963). Newman's biography, however, is the 
first attempt to cover Black's entire personal and professional life in a single volume. 
5 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 125-230. 
6 JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 122-30. 
7 Id. at 194-204. 
8 Id. at 2~1. 
9 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 143-343. 
10 Lewis F. PoweJI, Foreword to GuNTHER, supra note 1, at xiii. 
11 See jeffrey Rosen, The Craftsman and the Nihilist, NE\v REPusuc,July 4, 1994, at 36 
(reviewing GuNTHER, supra note 1). 
12 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at xviii. 
13 JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at ix. 
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various materials. 14 Hence, one can legitimately wonder about 
whether any or all three of these authors were especially susceptible to 
the temptation to write celebratory biographies. 
The books' subjects also make interesting comparisons. As three 
of the most influential American jurists in the twentieth century, they 
addressed many of the important legal issues decided by federal 
courts in the last hundred or so years. Their judicial temperaments 
and philosophies contrast sharply, with Black and Hand at polar op-
posites in terms of personality and approach to judicial decisionmak-
ing, and Powell falling in between with respect to both. Powell and 
Black naturally invite a comparison because they were both 
Southerners and because Powell took Black's seat. Moreover, Black 
served on the Court during a period when Hand was often thought to 
be a leading contender for a seat. 
This Review Essay suggests, nevertheless, that examining the re-
cent books about these three judges' lives and work sheds light most 
importantly on the special challenges confronting an author of a judi-
cial biography. Above all else, a judicial biographer must clarify what 
made his or her subject special as a judge. To achieve this basic objec-
tive, Gunther, Jeffries, and Newman had to master and organize ex-
traordinary amounts of material, clarify the special attributes of their 
subjects' judicial performances, demonstrate the relevance of their 
subjects' nonjudicial activities, convey the information others need to 
evaluate the quality of their subjects' judicial performances, and resist 
the urge to please those with vested interests in the depiction of their 
subjects. 
Each part of this Review Essay focuses on how each aut:~?-or dealt 
with a different challenge typically complicating the writing of a judi-
cial biography. Part I examines how well each biographer elucidated 
the most significant influence on a judge-his judicial philosophy, in-
cluding its roots. A biographer's challenge is to clarify how the sub-
ject decided cases and, in particular, to explain the judge's approach 
to judicial decisionmaking. Gunther, Jeffries, and Newman ably delin-
eate the various influences that shaped their subjects' attitudes toward 
judging, including each judge's personality, legal training, and public 
service. All three authors, however, make some questionable choices 
regarding which cases to cover, and each overemphasizes constitu-
tional law at the expense of a more comprehensive analysis of the sim-
ilarities and differences in each judge's constitutional, statutory, and 
common-law opinions. 
Part II evaluates each author's coverage of the collegial and insti-
tutional influences on his subject's judicial performance. Given that 
14 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 626-32. 
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Justices Black and Powell and Judge Hand each sat on multi-member 
courts for substantial periods, a significant question arises as to what 
kinds of colleagues they were. In this respect, Gunther, Jeffries, and 
Newman provide excellent descriptions of the personality conflicts 
with which their respective subjects dealt. Gunther and Jeffries detail 
the innovations made by Judge Hand and Justice Powell, respectively, 
to improve their colleagues' deliberations and working conditions. 
Newman and especially Gunther fail, however, to show how, if at all, 
Justice Black and Judge Hand were influenced by the other jurists 
with whom they sat. 
Part ill considers the extent to which the three authors provide 
balanced portraits of their subjects. It is not uncommon for a judicial 
biographer-or any biographer, for that matter-to have such close 
ties to or reverence for his subject that his impartiality is threatened. 
Jeffries and Newman surmount this hurdle. Gunther, in some ways, 
does not. 
Part IV addresses the question of judicial greatness. It suggests 
that judicial biographers need not reach conclusions about whether 
or not their subjects were great judges, but that they should provide 
sufficient information to enable others to make the appropriate judg-
ment. This task inevitably requires judicial biographers to consider 
whether their subjects made the "right" decisions in their most impor-
tant cases. Since consensus on the correctness of a judge's most im-
portant or controversial decisions is not likely, a judicial biographer 
must at least try to explain his criteria for measuring or depicting the 
quality of his subject's judicial performance and lasting significance as 
a judge. Part IV suggests two basic categories of information judicial 
biographers ought to cover for illuminating their subjects' signifi-
cance as judges: (1) the quality of a judge's decisionmaking (includ-
ing its craftsmanship, creativity, and influence) and (2) the nature of 
a judge's temperament (including the judge's leadership ability, re-
spect for opposing viewpoints, contributions to the collegiality of his 
court, and the courage of his convictions). Based on these criteria, 
Part IV concludes that Hand's greatness as a judge is, as Gunther as-
serts, justifiably based on the craftsmanship of his decisions in a wide 
range of areas. Justice Black's judicial greatness could similarly be 
grounded in the clarity, eloquence, and influence of his constitutional 
decisions; however, as Newman demonstrates, Black's judicial stature 
is undercut somewhat by his occasional willingness to sacrifice princi-
ple for personal aggrandizement. And although Justice Powell's 
greatness as a judge cannot be based solely on the opinions Jeffries 
discusses-Powell has renounced most of them-J effries demon-
strates that Powell's patience and equanimity on the bench are well 
worth emulating. 
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Part V examines a topic often taken for granted by judicial biog-
raphers and their readers: an analysis of how the subject became a 
judge, particularly whether the traits for which the judge would later 
become famous were apparent at the time of, or were the reasons for, 
his selection as a judge. The purpose of this inquiry is to determine 
whether the three biographies under review reveal anything about the 
means of selecting a great or influential judge that could be used to 
guide future judicial selection. This Part maintains that these biogra-
phies only partially shed light on two important aspects of judicial se-
lection-the unpredictability of judicial greatness and the consistent 
politicization of judicial selection throughout American history. 
This Review Essay concludes that a judicial biography poses many 
special challenges for an author, but none more important than 
demystifying the judicial function. This task requires a judicial biogra-
pher, at the very least, to clarify the most significant influences on, 
and special attributes of, the subject's judicial performance. Obvi-
ously, this task also entails explaining the relationship, assuming there 
is one worth exploring, between an individual's private life and public 
career. To clarify these matters, a judicial biographer must be pre-
pared to draw on relevant material from a wide variety of related 
fields, including history, psychology, law, and politics. Obviously, no 
judicial biographer can cover all of this material with equal ease, nor 
does each of these subjects necessarily merit the same amount of at-
tention in every judicial biography. Judicial biographers must make 
and explain their choices of which cases, related matters, or other 
events to cover. These choices ultimately reveal, even when they are 
as reasonable as those made by Gunther, Jeffries, and Newman, as 
much about the authors' attitudes concerning their subjects as about 
the subjects themselves. 
1 
ELUCIDATING THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION 
At the very least, a judicial biography should darify how a particu-
lar judge decided cases. This challenge requires the biographer to 
explain the various influences that shaped the subject's judicial per-
formance. One of the most important influences is the judge's philos-
ophy, that is, the judge's general understanding of the judicial 
function and customary approach to judicial decisionmaking. The 
more prolific and influential a judge is, the greater the effort the biog-
rapher must expend in choosing the cases that best reveal or typify the 
subject's judicial philosophy. Moreover, space concerns, and the 
need to keep readers' interests, compel biographers to ensure that the 
cases discussed reflect the subjects' judicial philosophies and explain 
the subjects' judicial outputs. 
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All of these challenges confronted Gunther, Jeffries, and New-
man in writing their respective judicial biographies. For instance, 
they each chose as a subject a judge who had participated in over 3000 
opinions, far more than any author could reasonably cover. All three 
biographers chose to ignore whole classes of cases, significant opin-
ions, or other key material that would have helped readers fully un-
derstand their subjects' judicial performances. For example, Newman 
discusses Black's activities as a senator for ten years, including his 
craftsmanship of what later became the Fair Labor Standards Act.15 
However, Newman never mentions whether Justice Black developed a 
philosophy of, or systematic approach to, legislative history or statu-
tory interpretation, nor does he mention whether any of the other 
justices raised questions about the propriety of Black's deciding cases 
involving statutes that he had helped to draft.16 Newman also does 
not discuss nor describe the methodology of Justice Black, who had 
been a highly successful personal injury lawyer, for handling torts 
claims on the Supreme Court.17 
Whereas Newman leaves out some of the significant classes of 
cases Justice Black decided, Gunther fails, in spite of his attempt to 
cover a representative cross-section ofJudge Hand's opinions, to dis-
cuss some of Hand's most memorable decisions. For instance, despite 
the widespread speculation about why Judge Hand was never ap-
pointed to the Supreme Court or how he would have performed as a 
justice, Gunther fails to mention, much less to discuss, Judge Hand's 
performance in Alcoa18-the landmark antitrust case in which Judge 
Hand was part of a special, congressionally authorized panel of the 
Second Circuit that essentially sat as the Supreme Court when the 
Court, due to recusals, could not muster a quorum. Nor does Gun-
ther explore three other landmark decisions by Judge Hand-United 
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 19 in which Hand broke new ground by ap-
plying economic reasoning to a negligence case; The T J Hooper,20 in 
which Hand declared that compliance with custom is not a defense to 
a charge of negligence; and Helvering v. Gregory,21 in which Hand 
originated the "substance over form" doctrine. Hand was at his most 
15 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 214-19. 
16 One exception is Newman's thorough discussion of jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Lo-
cal 6167, UMW, 325 U.S. 161 (1945), in which justice Robertjackson challenged the pro-
priety of justice Black's hearing a case under the Fair Labor Standards Act argued by his 
former Jaw partner. NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 333-37. 
17 Newman briefly mentions that Black tended to uphold the claims of injured work-
ers but never provides any details of Black's arguments or reasoning in such cases. See 
NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 473. 
18 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
19 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
20 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932). 
21 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
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creative and imaginative in these cases, contrasting sharply with his far 
more restrained approach in constitutional cases-a contrast Gunther 
never identifies, much less explores.22 
For his part, Jeffries deliberately limited the scope of his coverage 
of Powell's judicial career to "six areas of commanding interest: de-
segregation, abortion, Watergate, the death penalty, affirmative ac-
tion, and sexual equality"23 because they revealed "the individual 
beneath the judicial robes. Here the link between the private man 
and the public figure can be clearly seen, and the surprising impact of 
one Supreme Court Justice on ·the nation's history can be correctly 
gauged."24 Yet, the Powell that emerges in Jeffries's book differs from 
the Powell that appears in many of the constitutional and statutory 
cases not explored by Jeffries: the former Powell is moderate and rela-
tively consistent, whereas the latter Powell tends to be more conserva-
tive and inconsistent.25 Nor does Jeffries show how nearly forty years 
in corporate practice shaped Powell's corporate and securities opin-
ions for the Court.26 
In fact, each author places an inordinate emphasis on his sub-
ject's constitutional law opinions. One obvious reason for this focus is 
that both Gunther and Jeffries specialize in constitutional law and 
might have been particularly interested in decisions involving their 
area of expertise. Similarly, Newman has taught constitutional law at 
New York University Law School and has long been interested in, and 
written about, the FirstAmendment.27 Moreover, Jeffries explicitly ac-
knowledged that the cases he intended to cover were those that 
"aroused intense passion and debate. Indeed, most of them still 
do. "28 Hence, the authors quite reasonably may have focused on the 
judges' constitutional law opinions because these opinions have signif-
icant social and political ramifications, implicate the judges' politics, 
and involve many of" the most difficult issues with which the judges 
had to grapple while on the bench. The problem is that this emphasis 
precluded the authors from comprehensively clarifying the nature of 
the judicial function and identifying the commonalities or differences 
among their respective judges' decisions in constitutional, statutory, 
and common-law cases. 
22 See infra notes 216-22 and accompanying text. 
23 JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at xi. 
24 Id. at xi-xii. 
25 Cf. Henry A. Abraham, Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr., in THE SUPREME CoURT JuSTICES: A 
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 357, 357-66 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994) (reviewing a broader 
range of Powell's decisions in order to capture Powell's essentialjurisprudence). 
26 See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 
(1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
27 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 742. 
28 JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at xi. 
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The authors' focus enabled them, however, to clarify how their 
subjects performed in some mcyor constitutional disputes. The au-
thors fully describe the different judicial philosophies their subjects 
developed to resolve the so-called "countermcyoritarian difficulty''29-
the possibility of unprincipled or self-interested judicial interference 
with the decisions of the people's duly elected representatives. More-
over, the authors explained how these philosophies were shaped by 
their subjects' upbringing and training; personality and character; re-
action or attraction to certain social, political, and judicial move-
ments; and vision of the judicial role in American society. 
For instance, Gunther thoroughly traces the origins and nature 
of Hand's judicial philosophy. Above all else, Gunther conveys 
Hand's steadfast beliefinjudicial restraint as an unmitigated virtue in 
constitutional cases. As Gunther explains, Judge Hand's "decisions 
were noted not for dramatic overturning of mcyoritarian sentiments, 
but rather for superior craftsmanship and for creative performance 
within the confines set by the executive and legislative branches."30 
Yet, Hand's conception of judicial restraint seems odd by today's stan-
dards, especially his suggestion during his 1958 lectures at Harvard 
Law School that no principled basis for judicial review could clearly be 
found in the Constitution and that the dangers ofjudicial over-reach-
ing were so great that citizens-and judges-should regard the Con-
stitution and its amendments as a series of admonitory moral 
principles, rather than as a set of rights to be enforced by judges.31 
Given such views, it is not surprising that Hand invalidated statutes on 
constitutional grounds on only two occasions.32 
Because Gunther realized that many of his readers would find 
this record unusual, he devotes much time to delineating its roots and 
evolution. First, Gunther describes Hand's favorite teacher at 
Harvard Law School, James Bradley Thayer, as playing a key role in 
shaping Hand's attitude toward judging. As Hand recalled, Thayer 
"was to imbue [his students] with a skepticism about the wisdom of 
setting up courts as the final arbiters of social conflicts."33 Through-
out the book, Gunther repeats that Hand's unwavering faith in judi-
cial restraint could be attributed to Thayer's teachings. This 
29 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGERous BRANCH: THE SuPREME CouRT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986). 
30 GuNTHER, supra note 1, at xvi. 
31 Id. at 654-64. 
32 See Frew v. Bowers 12 F.2d 625 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 682 (1926) (concur-
ring in a judgment to strike down a provision of the 1921 Revenue Act as violating the Fifth 
Amendment due process clause); Seelig v. Baldwin, 7 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 293 
U.S. 522 (1934) (striking down a New York law that prescribed minimum prices New York 
dealers could pay milk producers as violating the Fourteenth Amendment due process 
clause). 
33 GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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allegiance led Hand to oppose "the courts' reliance on the vague 
terms of the due-process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to block legislative decision making."34 
In fact, Hand's upbringing, legal training, law practice, tenure on 
the district court, and first decade on the Second Circuit coincided 
with the rise of substantive due process to protect economic interests. 
Hand, however, was also an early convert to the "progressive" move-
ment which believed that the national government should regulate 
commerce and industry in the interests of justice.35 Consequently, 
Hand was outraged by the Court's substantive due process decisions-
decisions which tended to thwart progressive policies. He also acted 
on his political beliefs throughout much of his professional life. For 
example, he persuaded Theodore Roosevelt, whose acquaintance he 
had cultivated, to read his friend Herbert Croly's progressive mani-
festo, The Promise of American Life, which became Roosevelt's bible.36 
Hand worked with Croly to establish The New Republic for which Hand 
occasionally wrote unsigned articles "about judicial power and social 
reform, issues central to his involvement with the Progressive party."37 
In 1912, Hand, then a federal district judge for three years, joined 
Roosevelt's Progressive Party, helped draft its platform, and a year 
later ran unsuccessfully on the Party's ticket for a seat on the New 
York Court of Appeals.3S 
Gunther also suggests that Hand's personality was an important 
factor in his fervent commitment to judicial restraint.39 In the fore-
word to Gunther's book, Justice Powell echoes that, "[s]een in the 
context of his private life, Hand's philosophy [of judicial restraint] 
appears to h,ave been a product of personal sel£.doubt. "40 In fact, 
Hand was driven and haunted throughout his life by selfdoubt, culti-
vated by an "image of paternal perfection"41 in the figure of a father 
who had died when Hand was fourteen but whose achievements were 
34 Id. at 373. 
35 Id. at 202. 
36 Id. at 198-99. 
37 Id. at 246. 
38 Id. at 226-37. In describing this period of Hand's life, Gunther explains that: 
At that time, [Hand] thought it appropriate for a federal judge to offer 
private advice, as he so frequently did with Theodore Roosevelt, so long as 
there was no prominent public identification with the cause. This view of 
acceptable judicial conduct, while not unusual at the time, was less restric-
tive than today's official view or Hand's later view. By the time he was on 
the appellate court, Hand consistently avoided political involvements and 
public identification with causes that could be seen as "agitation." 
Id. at 237 (footnotes omitted). 
39 Id. at xvii. 
40 Powell, supra note 10, at xiii. 
41 GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 6. 
1604 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1595 
far more modest than his family maintained.42 Hand's penchant for 
self-doubt was reinforced at Harvard College by two significant 
events-first, by his exclusion from its elite societies and activities and 
second, by Hand's attraction to philosophical or moral skepticism.43 
Gunther maintains that the latter accounts for Hand's predilection to 
question everything, including his own judicial decisions, and to 
doubt the existence of moral absolutes or objectively right answers.44 
As a judge, Hand's self-doubt is evident in his consistent deference to 
legislatures and precedent. On the bench, his skepticism often led 
him not just to decide the case before him but often to look for-even 
sometimes to question-essential principles of doctrine and to wrestle 
openly with larger issues relating to the role of the judiciary in a dem-
ocratic society.45 Although Gunther does not say so explicitly, his por-
trait of Hand leaves the reader with the impression that Hand was 
more adept at discerning the reasons for courts to refrain from inter-
fering with majoritarian enactments than he was at defending judicial 
review to protect constitutional guarantees. 
One aspect of Hand's thinking that eludes Gunther, however, is 
the distinction between skepticism and pragmatism. To be sure, 
Hand often professed his belief that no moral conviction can be ob-
jectively true.46 This skepticism is apparent in Hand's immigration 
decisions, in which he made the touchstone of "good moral charac-
ter" -a statutory prerequisite to naturalization-the moral standards 
actually prevailing in society, rather than Hand's own standards or 
those of the nation's ethicalleaders.47 Hand's moral relativism also 
may have reinforced his willingness to accept the propriety of almost 
thirty years of wrenching separations from his wife, who preferred the 
company of a Dartmouth French teacher.48 In this sense, Hand, like 
his "unblemished idol" Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,49 seemed to 
42 Id. at 6-9, 133. 
43 At Harvard College, Hand's favorite teachers were William James, Josiah Royce, 
and George Santayana. He seriously contemplated becoming a philosopher, but none of 
his teachers encouraged him to pursue it. Consequently, he went to law school. Id. at 35-
37. 
44 Id. at 290-91. 
45 Id. at 373. 
46 See Richard A Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of judicial Great-
ness, 104 YALE LJ. 511, 532 (1994) (book review). 
47 See Posusta v. United States, 285 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1961); Schmidt v. United States, 
177 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1949); Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947); 
United States v. Francioso, 164 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1947); United States ex reL Iorio v. Day, 34 
F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1929); GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 629-38 (discussing Hand's decisions in 
Yin-Shing Woo v. United States, 288 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1961)). Hand's colleague Judge 
Jerome Frank urged his colleagues to adopt the moral standards of the nation's ethical 
leaders. GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 631. 
48 Id. at 183-88. 
49 Id. at 345. 
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have treated moral values as merely personal preferences or matters 
of public opinion. 5o 
Yet, Hand was not a perfectly consistent philosophical skeptic. As 
reflected in his ardent support for progressive causes, he had suffi-
ciently strong convictions to take sides on almost all of the burning 
issues of his day. Moreover, he was not skeptical of his own skepti-
cism, and he apparently did not feel the need to explain how it was 
that his own views-even as a judge-were privileged. Hand denied 
metaphysical truth, but he did not deny the possibility of the existence 
of "the local, practical, always revisable truths of science and of every-
day life. "51 In this sense, Hand was a pragmatist who, at least as a 
common-law judge, tested the waters ahead for trouble, creatively ex-
plored the limits of precedent, tended to move incrementally, and 
wrote in what Karl llewellyn called the "Grand" style of opinion-writ-
ing. 52 For most of his life, Hand distrusted courts more than he dis-
trusted legislatures. He seemed to have lost faith in both by the 1950s. 
A consistent skeptic doubts the existence of all absolutes, but a prag-
matic judge, as Hand seemed to have been, resolves cases and accepts 
fixed standards in the form of a constitutional mandate, a controlling 
precedent, or a legislative directive. 
Comparing Gunther's portrait of Hand with Newman's picture of 
Black reveals that the two judges were quite different in terms of per-
sonality and judicial philosophy. Whereas Hand was prone to self-
doubt, Black was imbued with "boundless self-confidence."53 While 
Hand did not believe in absolutes of truth, and this belief may have 
led Hand to hesitate in identifying a single, fixed principle embodied 
in a constitutional guarantee, the cornerstone of Black's constitu-
tional faith was that "there are 'absolutes' in our Bill of Rights, and 
that they were put there on purpose by men who knew what words 
meant, and meant their prohibitions to be 'absolutes.' "54 Justice 
Black equated the notion of absolutes with bright line tests drawn or 
applied by the courts to prevent the dilution of individual liberties or 
the aggrandizement of any branch, beyond its proper realm of author-
50 See LEARNED HAND, A Personal Confession, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBER'IY: PAPERS AND AD-
DRESSES OF LEARNED llANo 302, 307 (3d ed. 1960) ("Values are incommensurables. You 
can get a solution only by a compromise, or call it what you will. It must be one that 
people won't complain of too much; but you cannot expect any more objective measure."). 
51 Posner, supra note 46, at 530. 
52 Professor Karl Llewellyn dedicated his book on the common-law tradition to 10 
great commercial judges, including Learned Hand, "whose work across the centuries has 
given living body, toughness and inspiration to the Grand Tradition of the Common Law." 
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CoMMON LAw TRADmoN: DECIDING APPEALS v (1960) (as quoted 
in the dedication). 
53 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 169. 
54 Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865, 867 (1960). 
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ity.55 Justice Black saw the Constitution as a set of commands 
designed to prevent the recurrence of certain historic evils, and once 
he had determined the scope of a constitutional mandate through its 
literal language or the framers' intent, he rigorously applied it, re-
gardless of the consequences or conflicting precedent. 56 As Newman 
explains: "Black wanted, above all, principles of individual rights hard 
and clear so that other persons in power, especially judges, couldn't 
squirm out of them."57 
Newman identifies several factors that shaped Justice Black's judi-
cial philosophy. For example, Black's upbringing as a Populist in a 
small town in Alabama instilled in him a belief that the law should 
work for the common people.58 According to Newman, "The first 
thing [Black] saw in a case ... was the human being involved-the 
human factors, a particular man or woman's hopes and suffering; this 
became the focus of all his compassion,"59 Black's experiences as a 
police court judge and county prosecutor taught him "that crime 
sprang from poverty, economic injustices and the social diseases and 
frustrations that were their by-products. Government had to address 
itself to these problems."60 Black's concerns about the law's impact 
on people and his first-hand experiences with the criminal justice sys-
tem uniquely qualified him to urge the Court to strictly enforce the 
constitutional provisions defining the conditions of trial by jury and 
the availability of counsel and those prohibiting coerced confessions, 
compulsory seU:incrimination, and double jeopardy. 61 
55 Id. at 869-71. For Black, this was an essential feature of a system of checks and 
balances "designed to prevent any branch ... from infringing individual liberties safe-
guarded by the Constitution." Id. at 870. 
56 Yet, Justice Black felt that a judge should not be a captive of his own judicial philos-
ophy. As he once explained to his former law clerk, now Judge Guido Calabresi: 
[A] wise judge chooses, among plausible constitutional philosophies, 
one that will generally allow him to reach results he can believe in-a judge 
who does not to some extent tailor his judicial philosophy to his beliefs 
inevitably becomes badly frustrated and angry .... A judge who does not 
decide some cases, from time to time, differently from the way he would 
wish, because the philosophy he has adopted requires it, is not a judge. But 
a judge who refuses ever to stray from his judicial philosophy, and be sub-
ject to criticism for doing so, no matter how important the issue involved, is 
a fool. 
Guido Calabresi, Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accauntahility (What the Bark-
Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HAR.v. L. REv. 80, 132 n.169 (1991), quoted in NEWMAN, supra 
note 3, at 435 n.*. 
57 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 484. 
58 Id. at 1, 6-7. 
59 ld. at 472-73 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting CHARLES REICH, THE SoR-
CERER OF BoLINAS REEF 24 (1976)). 
60 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 48-49. 
61 See Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tal£ of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of justices 
Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L REv. 25, 57-58 (1994) (explaining the relationship between 
Black's life experiences and his decisions in these areas of constitutional law). 
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Newman submits further that Black's concerns about making the 
government work for the common people led him to join the Demo-
cratic party at an early age. He remained a fiercely loyal member for 
the rest of his life. 62 Like all good liberal Democrats of his era, Black 
abhorred the Supreme Court's use of substantive due process to strike 
down progressive economic legislation. For instance, in the Senate, 
Black voted against the confirmation of Charles Evans Hughes as 
Chief Justice because he feared Hughes favored substantive due pro-
cess to protect economic interests. 53 Moreover, Senator Black's state-
ments in numerous committee hearings and floor debates 
foreshadowed much of the philosophy he would later espouse on the 
Supreme Court, including his belief that Congress had the authority 
under the Commerce Clause to pass appropriate legislation to deal 
with any problem that directly or indirectly affected the national econ-
omy. Further, he believed federal courts lacked constitutional author-
ity to interfere with such enactments.64 
Justice Black wasted no time in intensifying his campaign to end 
substantive due process. He would recall that substantive due process 
was "why I came on the Court. I was against using due process to 
force the views ofjudges on the coun_try."65 Newman concedes that: 
It is difficult to overstate the centrality of this tenet of his creed, and 
as long as Black remained on the Court, no state economic regula-
tion was invalidated on the grounds of denial of substantive due 
process. Reappearance under any form or any name alarmed him, 
and he remained ever vigilant. 66 
Yet, as Newman explains, President Franklin Roosevelt's Supreme 
Court appointees, including Black, could not agree on what approach 
to substitute for substantive due process-other than a very deferen-
tial reading of the due process clause in cases involving economic in-
terests-and on how to interpret noneconomic liberty claims, 
particularly those based on specific constitutional provisions. 67 For 
example, Judge Hand's close friend, Justice Felix Frankfurter, pro-
posed extreme judicial deference to legislative judgments across the 
board. 68 Justice Black, by contrast, favored constitutional literalism 
and formalism as a way of eliminating judicial activism in economic 
62 See NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 6-7; see also id. at 140-41 (noting that Black was "a 
yellow-dog Democrat" who adopted Thomas jefferson's conception of the party). 
63 Id. at 134-35. 
64 ld. at 157-58, 208-19, 228. 
65 I d. at 277 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sidney Zion, Interview with 
Hugo Black for N.Y. TIMES obituary (May 1967)). 
66 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 373. 
67 ld. at 295; see also GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 562-66 (discussing the economic and 
political dealings between the New Deal justices). 
68 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 563. 
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due process cases. But, Black also advocated bold judicial enforce-
ment of the Constitution's explicit guarantees. Justice Black's textual-
ism represented his attempt to limit judicial discretion and to justify 
judicial flexibility in enforcing and interpreting the constitutional 
text.69 
Despite Justice Black's efforts to remain faithful to the constitu-
tional text and its original meaning, Newman traces the dramatic 
changes injustice Black's judicial performance during his last decade 
on the Court. 7° In the 1960s, an aging Black, bent on setting the rec-
ord for the longest tenure for a Supreme Court justice, suffered from 
various ailments, including cataracts, which hindered his longstanding 
practice of researching his opinions thoroughly. 71 He also grew in-
creasingly impatient with what he regarded as a lack of respect for law 
and order on the part of many civil rights protestors.72 Black's opin-
ions grew shorter and often contained an unprecedented note of an-
ger and exasperation. Additionally, Black became more curt with his 
colleagues. 73 
Newman's biography of Justice Black, when read together with 
Jeffries's biography ofjustice Powell, demonstrates two things the jus-
tices had in common as Southerners. First, the Justices' Southern 
manners and gentility helped to ease the often tense atmosphere of 
the Court.74 Second, the justices, like many liberal Southerners dur-
ing the first-half of this century, favored the end of state-mandated 
segregation of the races, but were uncomfortable with court-ordered 
integration because they feared it would create mayhem in the 
South.75 For example, Justice Black was one of the first justices to join 
69 See Michael J. Gerhardt, Hugo Lafayette Black, in THE SuPREME CouRT juSTicES: A 
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 5, 5-14 (Melvin l. Urofsky ed., 1994); Gerhardt, supra note 61, at 
56. 
70 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 568-70. 
71 Id. at 562-63. 
72 ld. at 591-95. 
73 ld. at 588-89; see also Roger K. Newman, Hugo L. Black, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION 121, 122 (Leonard Levy et al. eels., 1986) (recounting that in the 
1960s, Black's poor health and his impatience with the excesses of political protest led him 
to write shorter, angrier opinions and to show less tolerance for dissenting speech than he 
had shown during his previous 24 years on the Court). 
74 See JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 507-08, 561; NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 336-37. 
75 Newman calls Black "a 'southern liberal' in the populist tradition." NEWMAN, supra 
note 3, at 127. Jeffries describes Powell as 
reluctant to speak out in a way that would impair the influence of the natu-
ral ruling class. In short, Powell's silence on desegregation was explained as 
much as anything by his social and political solidarity with the establish-
ment of segregation. Even when he wanted change, he worked only from 
within. 
JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 180. Moreover, Jeffries suggests: 
Although [Powell] had opposed massive resistance and interposition, no 
sane person could have thought him a "liberal integrationist." ... Powell 
accepted integration but not busing. . . . [M]any southerners saw the in-
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Brown v. Board of Education.76 He endorsed the Court's efforts tore-
move all "the legal impediments to segregation" in the public 
schools.77 However, his concerns about massive resistance to desegre-
gation in the South led him to urge the Court to say as little as possi-
ble in ordering a remedy to state-mandated segregation. 78 Similarly, 
Justice Powell, who replaced Justice Black on the Court, was con-
cerned about massive Southern resistance to court-ordered busing im-
plemented to integrate the public schools and consequently urged 
limited use of that·particular remedy.79 
Otherwise, Justice Powell's judicial philosophy fits almost squarely 
between Justice Black's absolutism and Judge Hand's extreme defer-
ence. Interestingly, one source ofPowell'sjurisprudenceJeffries iden-
tifies is a propensity toward self doubt, which Powell shared with Judge 
Hand.80 Jeffries notes that Powell's "long string of achievements were 
not the fruits of easy confidence, but of ceaseless struggle against self-
doubt. Fiercely ambitious, yet ineradicably unsure, Powell always had 
to prove himself. "81 Once on the Court, Justice Powell, in keeping 
with his cautious personality, gravitated toward balancing competing 
interests in constitutional cases. Hence, although Jeffries refers to 
Powell as a "hard-line moderate,"82 he explains that Powell "took Uus-
tice John Harlan] as the model of what a judge should be-a fair-
minded arbiter of disputes, carefully adapting past precedents to pres-
ent realities in a process more pragmatic than ideological."83 Jeffries 
describes Justice Powell's approach to judging as a "characteristic 
[search] to narrow conflict, to accommodate opposing views, and, 
when that was not possible, to disagree without deepening divisions 
and precluding future rapprochement."84 In other words, for Powell, 
substance and style were inseparable. Even so, Jeffries finds that at the 
outset of his tenure on the Court, Justice Powell tended to be a strong 
proponent of judicial restraint, particularly in criminal law and school 
creasingly detailed and demanding desegregation decrees of the late 1960s 
as a second Reconstruction, carried out by judges rather than generals, but 
scarcely less oppressive. 
Id. at 298-99. 
76 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
77 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 550. 
78 Id. at 439. Indeed, Newman recounts, Black especially regretted agreeing for the 
sake of unanimity to placing the phrase "with all deliberate speed" in the Court's first 
decision implementing Brown. See id. at 440. 
79 JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 331. 
80 See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. 
81 JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 8. 
82 Id. at 131. 
83 Id. at 263. 
8 4 Id. at 561. 
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desegregation cases, but he grew increasingly less afraid of strong judi-
cial enforcement of individual guarantees. 85 
An interesting question is how Justice Powell arrived at a relatively 
moderate view of the Constitution despite what Jeffries describes as 
his deeply conservative instincts and background. Jeffries suggests 
three factors shaped Justice Powell's approach to deciding cases: (1) 
he cared about the consequences of his decisions; (2) he listened 
carefully to all sides of a legal dispute; and (3) his cautious personality 
and sense of fairness led him to look for a middle ground on which to 
resolve every case.86 For example, as Jeffries describes, Justice Powell 
joined the majority in Roe v. Watfe87 because he could not ignore the 
sometimes tragic effects of driving abortion underground, an inevita-
ble consequence of an opposite resolution of the case by the Court. 88 
Justice Powell was similarly influenced by the arguments made by civil 
rights groups and university officials in Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia v. BakkeS9 that a complete prohibition of all forms of race con-
sciousness in admissions decisions would virtually destroy the limited 
but important progress that was being made in integrating higher ed-
ucation, the business world, and the professions.90 In addition, Justice 
Powell's rulings regarding school busing were informed by his con-
cern that middle-class parents would abandon urban public schools 
for private or suburban alternatives if sprawling attendance zones and 
long bus rides replaced the neighborhood school.91 Jeffries also uses 
United States v. Nixon92-the Watergate tapes case-to illustrate Pow-
ell's ultimately successful efforts to persuade his colleagues to find a 
middle ground. In that case, the Court recognized that a President is 
not above the law but that he is entitled to a qualified privilege to 
maintain the confidentiality of some communications in the Oval Of-
fice. InJustice Powell's view, this standard protected a President from 
harassment by citizens or the other branches while simultaneously 
preserving a significantjudicial role in protecting individual rights.93 
II 
CLARIFYING JUDICIAL INTERACTION ON A CoLLEGIAL CouRT 
It is not enough for a biographer of an appellate judge to show 
how certain philosophical trends and life events influenced the sub-
85 Id. at 410. 
86 Id. at 560-62. 
87 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
88 JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 347. 
89 438 u.s. 265 (1978). 
90 Id. at 470. 
91 Id. at 290-331. 
92 418 u.s. 683 (1974). 
93 See JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 384-89. 
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ject's attitudes about judging. An appellate judge cannot resolve a 
case without the participation of his colleagues. Ajugge's interaction 
with the rest of his court-or the absence of such interaction-must 
therefore receive due consideration from his biographer. 
Gunther, Jeffries, and Newman do not indicate, however, 
whether Judge Hand and Justices Powell and Black were ever influ-
enced by any of their colleagues or law clerks in their decisionmaking. 
This omission leaves the reader with the impression that, as unlikely as 
it might have been, these judges were either perfectly independent or 
unremittingly stubborn. 
Of the three authors, Newman most thoroughly discusses his sub-
ject's interactions with his colleagues. Newman describes Justice Black 
as the consummate politician who understood instinctively the impor-
tance of maintaining cordial collegial relationships. Justice Black ap-
preciated the fact that civility and friendly relations with ~is colleagues 
made persuasion possible. Hence, when Black first arrived on the 
Court, he wasted no time in trying to befriend all of his colleagues, 
including the cantankerous James McReynolds.94 Over the next few 
decades, Newman suggests, Black's usually polite demeanor and civil-
ity were often put to the test. 95 Throughout these occasional conflicts, 
as Justice Douglas no~ed, Justice Black "was always perfectly proper in 
his relationships. He never was personally vindictive."96 
Newman indicates that by 1962 Justice Black had become the 
Warren Court's "chief philosopher."97 This resulted from his skill at 
forging alliances that allowed him to outmaneuver his chief rival, Jus-
tice Frankfurter, for at least two decades. For instance, Newman re-
counts that when Earl Warren became Chief Justice in 1953, both 
Justices Black and Frankfurter courted him.98 At first, Chief Justice 
Warren tended to vote with Justice Frankfurter, but Chief Justice War-
ren soon found Justice Black's easy, straightforward manner more ap-
pealing -than Justice Frankfurter's more intense intellectualism. The 
Chief Justice began approaching cases from Justice Black's perspec-
tive. As Newman observes, "[i]f the Chief had been asked what had 
happened, he might have said, 'Felix irritates, Hugo soothes.' "99 
Yet, according to Newman, Justice Black also understood that 
Court relations could not always be pleasant. Newman suggests that 
Black would probably have agreed with Justice Holmes's purported 
94 NEWMAN, S!lpra note 3, at 272-73. 
95 See infra note 101 and accompanying text. 
96 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 336 (internal quotation marks omitted} (citation omitted 
in original). 
97 See id. at 537. 
98 See id. at 435-36. 
99 Id. at 470. 
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description of the Court as "[n]ine scorpions trapped in a bottle."1oo 
Indeed, Justice Black's stubbornness, his fierce commitment to his 
ideals, the close working conditions of the Court and some of the 
other justices' idiosyncracies sometimes undermined Justice Black's 
relations with certain colleagues. Newman recounts, for example, Jus-
tice Black's stormy relationships with Justices Frankfurter and Robert 
Jackson, both ofwhom could be petulant.101 Perhaps more tragically, 
Newman describes how Justice Black's two closest friendships on the 
Court-with Justices Owen Roberts and William Douglas-failed to 
stand the test of time. When Justice Black was first appointed to the 
Court in 1937, he andJustice Roberts became quite close.1o2 By 1944, 
however, Roberts distanced himself from Black for good after Frank-
furter had apparently convinced him that Black had been responsible 
for leaking unflattering reports about Roberts to the press.1os For 
over three decades, Douglas saw Black as his best friend on the Court, 
but this friendship deteriorated as Black became increasingly dis-
enchanted with what he regarded as Douglas' erratic work habits and 
dissolute lifestyle.104 
Yet, Newman indicates, Black above all else loved a good fight 
(especially those he won) and could overlook ideological differences 
to appreciate a colleague's skills or character. For example, Newman 
recounts that Black deeply mourned the passing of Chief Justice 
Hughes and Justices Roberts and Frankfurter, despite the fact that he 
had often disagreed with each of them.105 Black was enormously im-
pressed with Chief Justice Hughes's leadership on the Court and was 
quite surprised and moved (given his opposition to Hughes's nomina-
tion as ChiefJustice)106 by Hughes's friendly assistance in acclimating 
Black to the Court.107 Upon Hughes's death, Black said, "I felt that I 
lost one of my best friends ever."108 Hughes admired Black as well, 
100 Id. at 322. Black recognized that "there has never been a time since iLwas first 
instituted where there were not sharp differences of opinion among the Justices .... [I]t 
would be bad for [this] institution ... to have men who constantly profess to be of one 
mind on all issues. It would indicate either that they have no minds at all, or that they 
subserviently yield to their own views." Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting letter from Hugo L. Black to Sterling F. Black (Feb. 25, 1944)). 
101 See NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 322, 336, 346, 485-86. 
102 Id. at 273. 
103 Id. at 322-23. 
104 See id. at 382, 532, 599-600. 
105 Id. at 287, 323, 519-20. 
106 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
107 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 269. When Hughes retired from the Court in 1941, Black 
confessed to Hughes that "I would be untrue to my own impulses ifl should fail to tell you 
that as a result of our association I entertain a genuine personal affection." Id. at 287 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter from Hugo L. Black to Charles Evan 
Hughes (June 3, 1941)). 
108 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 287 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Interview 
with Irving Dilliard). 
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predicting as early as 1941 that justice Black will go down in history 
as one of the greatest Justices of the Supreme Court."109 Justices 
Black and Frankfurter often paid homage to the other's keen intel-
lect.110 Moreover, as Justice Douglas recalled,Justice Black had a spe-
cial fondness for Justice Roberts: "[Black] . . . would put down 
Roberts as, not the man he admired most, by any means, but the man 
whose company he enjoyed the most of almost anyone that he had 
met."111 
Unlike Justice Black,Justice Powell consciously avoided trying to 
persuade his colleagues to agree with his views. Jeffries explains: 
Powell had no interest in making deals. It seemed to him inappro-
priate. Powell approached the Court with a kind of reverence. The 
Supreme Court was the temple of his belief in reason, in modera-
tion, in the worth and progress of the search for a perfect balance 
of order and liberty .... [Building coalitions] would have been 
somehow unseemly.I12 
Hence, Powell's role as the pivotal vote in numerous cases may have 
been more often the byproduct of happenstance than his own design. 
Nevertheless,Jeffries suggests Justice Powell made two important 
contributions to the Court's collective decisionmaking. First, Powell 
persuaded his colleagues to adopt the practice known as the "cert 
pool" in which the Justices share their clerks' memoranda on the 
thousands of certiorari petitions that flood the Court.113 Second, Jus-
tice Powell's "ingrained courtesy and ability to listen" enabled him to 
maintain cordial relations with all of his colleagues, even in the midst 
109 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 287 n.* (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Let-
ter from James Farley to Virginia Hamilton Uuly 18, 1969)). 
110 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 483. For example, Newman explains that "Hugo genu-
inely believed Felix was his only worthy rival on the Court." Id. He quotes Black's refer-
ence to Frankfurter's reaction to one of his opinions as showing " 'that's why I say Felix is 
the brightest man on the Court.'" Id. (citing Gumo CA!.ABRESI, A COMMON LAw FOR THE 
AGE OF STATUTES (1982)). Similarly, Newman suggests, "Frankfurter was Black's greatest 
intellectual admirer." Id. For example, Newman relates how Frankfurter told Hand, 
among others, that Black had" 'the best brain [on the] Court.'" Id. at 483 (quoting THE 
MAKING OF THE NEW DEAL: THE INSIDERS SPEAK 70 (Katie Loucheim ed., 1983)). Frank-
furter also admitted to Chief Justice Warren that "[n]obody on the Court or off it has a 
better appreciation, I think, than I have of the intellectual powers of Hugo." ld. (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Felix Frankfurter Papers (Library of Congress)). In a 
memorial tribute to Justice Frankfurter, Black commented that Frankfurter had been "a 
formidable adversary who thrived on argument. . • • My initial respect and friendship for 
Felix survived all differences of opinion, in fact grew with the years." Id. at 519 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hugo L. Black, Mr. justice Frankfurter, 78 HAR.v. L. REV. 
1521 (1965) ). 
111 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 323 (citation omitted in original). 
112 JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 304-05. 
113 ld. at 270-72. Today the only holdout on the "cert pool" is Justice Stevens. ld. at 
272. 
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of the most heated exchanges.114 Powell was not a p~acemaker or a 
broker, but he made life at the Court more pleasant and kept dia-
logue open on many contentious issues on which, as it turned out, he 
cast the pivotal vote. 
Justice Powell's cautious personality and reserved manner some-
times hindered his communication with some of his colleagues. For 
example, according to Jeffries, Powell never found a way to bridge the 
gap that existed between him and Justice Thurgood Marshall in terms 
of "background and outlook."115 Moreover, as Jeffries explains, Jus-
tice White's "patience was occasionally exhausted by Powell's fastidi-
ous interest in all sides of every issue. Once White grew so 
exasperated with Powell's carefulness that he snapped his pencil in 
Powell's face and said he should make up his damn mind." 116 Powell, 
too, found White difficult, and he "sometimes resented the conten-
tiousness ofWhite's opinions."117 In contrast, the two colleagues with 
whom Powell had the closest personal relationships and conversed 
most easily were Justices Potter Stewart118 and Sandra Day 
O'Connor,119 with whom Powell shared similar backgrounds and 
outlooks. 
Whereas Hand's interaction with other Second Circuit judges did 
not have Powell's civility or Black's political savvy, Hand made, in 
Gunther's estimation, at least three significant contributions to his ap-
pellate court's collective decisionmaking. First, Hand ensured that 
the Second Circuit's use of preconference memoranda "achieved its 
greatest flowering during Hand's years of service" on that court.120 
These memoranda comprised a unique Second Circuit practice in 
which a panel delayed holding case conferences after oral argument 
so that its members could circulate written memoranda on the case. 
In taking the practice more seriously than any other judge of his era, 
Hand helped to enhance the quality of his court's dialogue about 
cases.121 
114 Id. at 561. 
115 Id. at 262. 
116 Id. at 265. 
117 ld. Jeffries also relates that, in 1974, when the White clerks took Powell to lunch, 
one of them said that the invitation was in part an attempt to make amends for the hard 
feelings that had arisen between the two chambers. Powell "graciously-but pointedly-
replied that it would take more than one lunch to do that." ld. (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citing statement made by Jonathan Varat to author (Aug. 18, 1992)). 
118 See id. at 262. Jeffries notes that Powell admired Justice Stewart, as many others did, 
for being "a lawyer's lawyer and a judge's judge." See id. Newman indicates Justice Black 
shared that opinion. See NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 564. 
119 See JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 505-08, 535. 
120 GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 287. 
121 ld. at 297-98. 
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Second, when he was a district judge, Hand pioneered the use of 
law clerks for judges in the Second Circuit and around the nation.122 
Hand used his clerks primarily as sounding boards to help sharpen his 
views on a case.123 Although Gunther suggests that the use of law 
clerks helped foster greater collegiality between the judges on the Sec-
ond Circuit,124 he does not acknowledge that their use also helped to 
create buffers between judges by allowing them to use their clerks as 
go-betweens. 
Third, Judge Hand, as the Chief Judge of the Second Circuit, at 
times attempted to mediate, with limited success, the sharp personal 
and ideological differences between his colleagues Judges Charles 
Clark and Jerome Frank.125 According to Gunther, Hand assured 
them "that tough, argementative opinions were entirely appropriate 
and he did not take them as personal insults."126 
It is unclear from Gunther's discussion, however, how well Hand 
made the transition from being a district judge for fifteen years to 
sitting on a multi-membered court. Gunther never discusses how the 
shift influenced Hand's attitude about judging. Yet, many district 
judges do not have the temperament to be part of a collegial body; 
they prefer to be solely in charge of their own courtrooms. Indeed, 
Gunther first mentions Hand's penchant for temper tantrums on the 
bench only after his arrival on the Second Circuit. Gunther recounts 
how Hand often lost his temper with incompetent counsel or even 
prominent lawyers he found unhelpful, 127 satirized various colleagues 
behind their backs,128 turned his back during oral arguments to ex-
press his contempt for a poor argument, 129 and ridiculed lawyers and 
incompetent district court judges in his preconference memo-
randa.130 We also know that during Gunther's clerkship with Hand in 
the 1950s, Hand once threw a paperweight at Gunther and scolded 
him for continuing to criticize the judge's draft opinions in a difficult 
espionage case.131 
122 Id. at 140, 288. 
123 Id. at 289-91. 
124 Id. at 288. 
125 Id. at 532. 
126 Id. He even added, in an aside to Judge Frank, that he too liked to have his dissents 
hit hard. Id. 
127 Id. at 301. One such target was justice john Harlan, who once reminded Hand how 
the latter had ruled in Harlan's favor but not before throwing Harlan's brief back at him in 
oral argument "with the statement that [Hand] would not read it." In Commemoration of 
Fifty Years of Federal Judicial Service, 264 F.2d 1, 24 (Apr. 10, 1959) (remarks ofjustice 
John M. Harlan). 
128 See GuNrHER, supra note 1, at 300-01. 
129 See id. at 301. 
130 See id. at 301-02. 
131 See id. at 620. 
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Gunther, however, fails to provide other pertinent data about 
Hand's tirades, including his colleagues' perceptions of or reactions 
to them and the degree to which the outbursts impeded oral argu-
ments.132 Perhaps most importantly, Gunther fails to identify the spe-
cific causes of Hand's judicial outbursts, such as the particular 
problems in an oral argument, brief, or lower court opinion that set 
Hand off, or the degree to which the outbursts might have been 
caused by Hand's own feelings of insecurity or inadequacy. Gunther's 
failure to address such issues leaves his readers with an incomplete 
image of how Hand oversaw oral arguments and trials. Others give a 
somewhat bleaker portrait ofHand'sjudicial demeanor from that pro-
vided by Gunther.133 For instance, John Frank, a former Yale Law 
School professor and law clerk to Justice Black, once suggested that 
Hand "has a reputation as the most irritable man on the [Second Cir-
cuit] ."134 Similarly, Judge Clark, for whom Gunther suggests Hand 
"never developed affection,"135 once confided to Justice Frankfurter, 
"I have cringed at times to see him ride lawyers. Some years since, 
Virginia Howland appealed to me to try to stop Learned from being 
so harsh on counsel; but who was I to beard or tame a lion."136 
Though Gunther never concedes the possibility, it would have been 
interesting to determine whether or to what extent Hand's notorious 
temper erupted during exchanges with fellow judges and whether 
these interactions tainted Hand's relations with them. 
It is important for a biographer to provide an "objective" descrip-
tion of a judge's colleagues in order to fully understand the relation-
ship between the judge and those colleagues. Unlike Gunther, both 
Newman and Jeffries avoid the temptation of accepting their subjects' 
attitudes about their colleagues as truth. Newman, for example, gen-
erally provides detailed, balanced portraits of the other justices with 
132 Nor does Gunther reveal whether Hand ever lost his temper with his colleagues or 
whether they shared his perceptions of the lawyers appearing before him. Gunther does, 
however, describe Hand's disappointment with the quality of the lawyers practicing before 
him and his modest but unsuccessful efforts to exhort the bar to improve, see id. at 145-47. 
But Gunther fails to explore how Hand's own meager practice experience hampered his 
efforts to improve the quality of the advocacy in his court. In addition, Gunther fails to 
indicate whether Hand's colleagues knew about or suspected his disdain for them and 
how, if at all, they reacted. We are not told, for instance, whether or in what way Hand 
made efforts to help those colleagues whom he regarded as incompetent to improve their 
judicial performances. Gunther also neglects to describe how Hand himself performed in 
oral argument, including the kinds of questions he asked. 
133 See, e.g., Learned Hand, Fifty Year.s of Federal judicial Seroice, in HANDBOOK FOR jUDGES 
97 (Donald K. Carroll ed., 1961). 
134 MARVIN ScHICK, LEARNED HAND's CouRT 15 (1971) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quotingJohn P. Frank, The Top U.S. Commercial Court, FoRTUNE, Jan. 1951, at 92, 95) ). 
135 GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 524. 
136 ScHICK, supra note 134, at 92 n.50 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Letter from jerome Clark to Felix Frankfurter (Sept. 29, 1954)). 
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whom Black sat during his tenure on the Court. Newman, however, 
tends to skimp in discussing Justice. Brennan, who by the 1960s 
emerged seemingly from the sidelines to become the Warren Court's 
"most influential justice";137 Black regarded Brennan as an apos-
tate.138 Jeffries likewise gives his readers an admirably independent, 
impartial portrait of the other justices with whom Powell sat.139 
Although depicting ajudge's colleagues from the judge's perspective 
helps to explain some of the judge's actions, a balanced judicial biog-
raphy needs both to provide some insight into how the judge's co-
workers perceived the judge and to convey a sense of the reliability of 
a subject's judgments about his colleagues. Hopefully, this effort casts 
some light on the credibility of the judge's opinions on other matters. 
The next Part considers whether Gunther, Jeffries, and Newman pres-
ent balanced portraits of their respective subjects. 
III 
MAINTAINING IMPARTIAU'IY IN A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 
It is a perennial challenge for a biographer to be impartial. Judi-
cial biographers are not immune to this challenge in part because 
many of them have had unusually close ties with their subjects, includ-
ing having worked for them as law clerks. The critical question is 
whether there is anything special about judging that lends itself to 
impartial or objective analysis or whether a writer is able, in spite of 
his close ties to or reverence for his subject, to write about the latter's 
life and work and credibly call it a "biography." Surely, we would not 
be naive enough to expect George Stephanapolous to write a fairly 
objective biography of President Clinton. We recognize the personal, 
political, and ideological dimensions of the Clinton-Stephanapolous 
relationship that would in all likelihood permeate such a project. The 
general public, if not academics, lawyers, and even other judges, is 
sometimes less quick to recoguize that some people might well have a 
vested interest in how the judge is remembered or how certain opin-
ions or conflicts should be depicted or understood. Hence, the issue 
is the extent to which Gunther,Jeffries, and Newman, in spite of their 
special kinship with their subjects, have put together balanced, even-
handed portraits of their subjects. 
While Jeffries and Newman rise to this challenge, Gunther falls 
short. For instance, Newman's portrait of Justice Black is remarkably 
candid. He fully relates the details of Black's association with the Ku 
Klux Klan. Black had been an active, card-carrying member of the 
137 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 563. 
138 Id. at 564. 
139 See JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 246-65, 504-08 (O'Connor), 534-35 (Scalia). 
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Klan from September 1923140 until 1925 when, at the suggestion of 
Grand Dragon Jim Esdale, he submitted a letter of resignation to be 
kept in Esdale's "safe agai:J?.st the day when [Black would] need to say 
[he was] not a Klan member."141 In fact, the Klan's support had been 
crucial to Black's 1926 Senate election. Newman acknowledges, 
"[t]he Klan was [Black's] source of strength. Without it he would 
have been a very minor candidate indeed, with negligible public-
ity."142 Indeed, after Black won the Democratic primary, the Montgom-
ery Advertiser reported that "above all [Black] is the darling of the Ku 
Klux Klan."143 
Newman shows that Black often said or did whatever he had to in 
order to succeed, that Black regularly used the word "nigger,"144 and 
that Black was decidedly anti-Catholic and xenophobic even for the 
1920s.145 As an Alabama senator, Black "twice proposed that all immi-
gration be suspended for five years, "146 twice voted against federal 
funding of Howard University,147 and in chairing Senate investigative 
committees, regularly "trample[d] over witness's [constitutional] 
rights" to get the information he wanted.148 
Moreover, during his confirmation hearings, Black maintained a 
calculated silence about his Klan membership, 149 breaking it only 
once in an exchange on the Senate floor with the truthful, but some-
what c!_isingenuous, response "that he was not now a Klansman."150 In 
the postconfirmation firestorm over his Klan membership, Black 
knowingly dissembled his Klan affiliation (by publicly confessing he 
had joined but "later resigned" from the Klan) in order to stifle the 
widespread demands for his resignation or removal.151 Even years 
later, Black would not fully confess the extent and ignominiousness of 
his association with the Klan. His explanations for joining the Klan 
changed over time, 152 and Black remained bitter at the newspapers 
who had attacked him for his Klan membership.153 Newman con-
140 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 91-93. 
141 ld. at 103 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the Virginia Hamilton 
Papers). 
142 ld. at 114. Newman explains further that in Black's first Senate election, Esdale was 
his campaign manager "in everything but name." Id. at 104. 
143 Id. at 115 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
144 See David Garrow, Doing]ustice, THE NATION, Feb. 27, 1995, at 280 (citations omitted 
in original) (reviewing GuNTHER, supra note 1 and NEWMAN, supra note 3). 
145 See NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 87, 104, 108, 137 n.*. 
146 Id. at 128. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 193. 
149 Id. at 239-42. 
150 Id. at 241 (citation omitted in original). 
151 Id. at 257-58; see also id. at 241 n.*. 
152 ld. at 96-100. 
153 Id. at 261. 
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cedes that Black "never really grasped, or could admit, the genuine 
outrage that the Klan caused."154 
In addition, Newman recounts Black's stubborn attempts to de-
fend his disastrous majority opinion in Korematsu v. United States, 155 
upholding the constitutionality of the federal internment ofJapanese-
Americans in World War II. Although historians subsequently estab-
lished that the military had no reliable evidence to substantiate its 
claims that Japanese Americans on the West Coast posed a threat to 
national security, Black never expressed any regret over the Korematsu 
decision. As criticism of Korematsu mounted in later years, Black 
boldly defended it, stating: "There's a difference between peace and 
war. You can't fight a war with the courts in control."156 Black added 
that all people of Japanese ancestry 
look alike to a person not aJap. Had they [the Japanese] attacked 
our shores you'd have a large number fighting with the Japanese 
troops. And a lot of innocent Japanese Americans would have been 
shot in the panic. Under these circumstances I saw nothing wrong 
in moving them away from the danger area.157 
Black "stood by the opinion until his death."158 Several other Justices, 
by contrast, subsequently expressed their regret over their responsibil-
ity for the internment. These included Earl Warren 159 (who had 
backed the internment as Attorney General of California), Justice 
Douglas (who had joined Korematsu), andJustice Tom Clark (who had 
coordinated the evacuation program in the early years of the war) .160 
Jeffries provides an equally balanced albeit somewhat less de-
tailed portrait of Justice Powell. Jeffries addresses three of Powell's 
most serious shortcomings. First, Jeffries is especially critical of Pow-
ell's performance in Bowers v. Hardwick,161 in which Powell cast the 
decisive fifth vote upholding a state's ability to criminalize private con-
sensual homosexual sodomy.162 According to Jeffries, Bowers is a clear 
case in which Powell's personal failings dictated his vote. As Jeffries 
explains, Powell ultimately failed to find a "middle ground" in Bowers 
because he was unable to comprehend the nature of homosexuality 
(despite numerous conversations about the subject with one of his law 
154 Id. at 260. 
155 323 u.s. 214 (1944). 
156 Gerhardt, supra note 69, at 12. 
157 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 318 (alteration in original) (citing N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 
1971). 
158 Id. at 319. Indeed, in 1967, Black defiantly told a questioner, " 'I would do pre-
cisely the same thing today.'" Id. at 318 (citing N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1971). 
159 Id. at 319 n.*. 
160 Jd. 
161 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
162 JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 524-30. 
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clerks, whom Powell did not know was gay) .163 Jeffries attributes Pow-
ell's lack of comprehension to his willful blindness to the existence of 
homosexuality: "Powell had never known a homosexual because he 
did not want to. In his world of accomplishment and merit, homosex-
uality did not fit, and Powell therefore did not see it."164 Powell's 
blindness precluded him from connecting with the case in some per-
sonal way that would have helped him to find a more equitable 
resolution. 
Second, Jeffries notes that post-retirement, Powell has renounced 
several of his major but more controversial decisions. For instance, in 
1990, Powell called his concurrence in Bowers "a mistake ... I do think 
it was inconsistent in a general way with Rne. When I had the opportu-
nity to reread the opinions a few months later, I thought the dissent 
had the better of the arguments. "165 Powell also has admitted that 
"the abortion opinions were 'the worst opinions I ever joined.' "166 In 
addition, despite having helped to secure the constitutionality of the 
death penalty while he was on the Court, Powell confessed after his 
retirement that he would now vote to strike down the death penalty 
because it no longer served a useful purpose and "could not be fairly 
and expeditiously enforced. "167 Such second-guessing reflects Pow-
ell's penchant for self-doubt in full bloom. 
In addition, Jeffries harshly scrutinizes Powell's conservative, seg-
regationist behavior as Chairman of the Richmond School Board 
(1952-61)168 and as a member of the Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion (1961-68).169 Throughout his tenure on both boards-a period 
that spanned the Court's decision in Brown v. Board ofEducation170 and 
163 Id. at 521. 
164 Id. at 529. 
165 Id. at 530 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Anand Agneshwar, Ex-Justice 
Says He May Have Been 'Wrong; NAT'L LJ., Nov. 5, 1990, at 3). Although Jeffries plainly 
considers Powell's concurrence in Bowers to have been a mistake, Jeffries's analysis of Bowers 
never suggests a credible constitutional ground on which the case could have been de-
cided. This silence is puzzling because Jeffries criticizes .Roe and Powell's decision to join it 
for lacking a sound constitutional foundation. Id. at 34041, 355-70. One can surmise, 
however, that Jeffries is probably persuaded that the equal protection clause provides a 
sensible basis on which the Court could have resolved Roe and Bowers and thus strike down 
both anti-abortion and anti-sodomy laws. Othenvise,Jeffries leaves unclear how his criti-
cism of Roe can be reconciled with his apparent sympathy for the fundamental rights claim 
in Bowers. 
166 Id. at 341 (citation omitted in original). The apparent reason for Powell's disap-
pointment is that, at the very least, he did not accurately predict how the public would 
react to those decisions. 
167 Id. at 451-52. 
168 Id. at 139-68. 
169 Id. at 168-78. 
170 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
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Virginia's massive resistance to integration171-Powell maintained a 
calculated silence on the issue of segregation. As J e:ffijes observes: 
In his two terms on the state board, Powell never did any more than 
was necessary to facilitate desegregation. He never took a leading 
role. He never spoke out against foot-dragging and gradualism. He 
never really identified himself with the needs and aspirations ofVir-
ginia's black schoolchildren .... He complied with the law, but 
"found it diplomatically sound not to do any more than absolutely 
required."172 
Unlike Jeffries and Newman, Gunther tends to rationalize or min-
imize his subject's foibles. His tone is uniformly laudatory. Three ex-
amples illustrate Gunther's failure to maintain the basic impartiality 
one expects in a balanced biography. 
First, Gunther routinely uses superlatives to describe Hand173 and 
his allies and friends.174 Sometimes Gunther carries this practice to 
such an extent that he misses the inconsistencies in his descriptions of 
Hand's record. For instance, Gunther claims that "[u]ntil the very 
end of his career, Learned Hand had no occasion to deviate from his 
usual reluctance to intexfere injudicial appointments."175 Yet, Gun-
ther recounts how both before and after this period Hand almost rou-
tinely intexfered with judicial selection.176 Moreover, in contrast to 
the laudatory language that Gunther invariably uses in describing 
171 JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 139-72. 
172 Id. at 172 (quotingBradleyv. School Bd. ofRichmond, 338 F. Supp. 67, 153 (E.D. 
Va. 1972)). 
173 For a small sampling, see, for example, GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 291 (describing 
"the sheer joyful thoroughness with which [Hand] tackled each case"); id. at314 (referring 
to "the characteristically lucid, elegant language [Hand] produced when he wrote for the 
printed reports"); id. at 352 (noting that "[o]ff the bench as well as on, [Hand] retained 
the capacity truly to listen to the other side's arguments and agonizingly to reexamine his 
own premises"); id. at 435 (suggesting that Hand's "changing evaluation of Franklin Del-
ano Roosevelt illustrates his lack of dogmatism and his capacity for growth"); id. at 471 
(referring to "Hand's remarkable perceptiveness in approaching statutory interpreta-
tion"); id. at 638 (observing with reference to the 1950s that "Hand's wisdom illuminated a 
dark decade"). For references to Hand's "eloquence" and "brilliance," see passim. 
174 See, e.g., id. at 143 (describing Charles M. Hough as "Hand's only early colleague in 
his own intellectual league, and the only one who became a close friend"). 
175 Id. at 647. 
176 See, e.g., id. at 647 (writing to President Eisenhower to urge Justice Harlan's ap-
pointment to the Supreme Coun); id. at 648 (pressing for Henry J. Friendly's appointment 
to the Second Circuit in 1957); id. at 649-50 (supporting Friendly's and impeding Irving 
Kaufman's appointment to the Second Circuit in 1958); id. at 652 (supporting Kaufman's 
nomination to the Second Circuit in 1961 after twice helping to bar his elevation from the 
District Coun); id. at 283 ("Hand was the leading promoter of [Thomas] Swan's appoint-
ment to the Second Circuit" in 1926); id. at 284 (urging the appointment of his cousin Gus 
Hand to the Second Circuit in 1929); id. at 286 (pressing unsuccessfully to have President 
Coolidge name District Judge Thomas Thacher to the Second Circuit in 1929); id. at 144 
(describing Martin Manton as "a Democratic clubhouse politician whose promotion to the 
Second Circuit in 1918 Hand unsuccessfully opposed"). 
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Hand, he employs demeaning or derogatory references to character-
ize those with whom Hand disagreed or for whom Hand had little 
respect (the two were essentially the same in Hand's mind).177 Gun-
ther should have confirmed Hand's stature through a more serious, 
sustained effort to compare Hand's arguments with the reasoning of 
the judges who disagreed with him. 
A second example of Gunther's lack of impartiality is his discus-
sion of the Holmes Lectures delivered in 1958 by Hand, then eighty-
seven. In the lectures, Judge Hand seriously questioned the justifica-
tions for judicial review, even in cases involving constitutional viola-
tions.178 In fact, Hand went so far in his lectures as to criticize Brown 
v. Board of Education179 as an example of unacceptable judicial activ-
ism, suggesting that the Supreme Court had acted as "a third legisla-
tive chamber" by imposing its views and values on the southern 
states.180 
Undoubtedly realizing the unpopularity of Hand's version of ju-
dicial restraint and his criticisms of Brown, Gunther goes to great 
lengths to cast the lectures in a favorable light. According to Gunther, 
Hand would have accepted Brown if the Court had announced that 
racial segregation was unconstitutional under the equal protection 
clause in all contexts.181 According to Gunther, Hand would have ac-
cepted that the Court had not merely imposed its own values if the 
matter were an issue of constitutional absolutes.182 Gunther suggests, 
however, that Hand was misled by Justice Frankfurter into believing 
177 See, e.g., id. at 143 (describing fellow District Judge George C. Holt as "a workman-
like judge but mediocre at best"); id. at 278 (describing Martin Manton as "a loner, preoc-
cupied with his political cronies and incapable of turning out memoranda and opinions 
that could earn him respect from the bar or bench"); id. (describing judge Henry Wade 
Rogers as "intellectually not much better" than Manton and as "periodically ill and, even 
when able to work, contributed little of quality"); id. (describing Judge Chase as "taciturn" 
and as not "an intellectual or a penetrating student of the law"); id. at 522-23 (describing 
Judge Charles Clark's "rigidity and tenacity, his proclivity for separate opinions, and his 
self.righ teousness"). 
178 Hand expressed this view in the first of the Holmes Lectures entitled "When a 
Court Should Intervene." This lecture provoked one of the most famous rebuttals in mod-
em legal history in the form of Professor Herbert Wechsler's Holmes Lectures delivered 
the very next year. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HAR.v. L. REv. 1 (1959). Wechsler not only criticized Hand's textual and historical claims 
but also Hand's suggestion that the need to avoid political turmoil and anarchy, rather 
than constitutional logic, mightjustif.}' the invalidation of laws in rare cases. Rejecting 
Hand's magisterial notion that judges should strike down laws as a matter of prudence only 
when the constitutional system was in danger of "collapse," Wechsler called on the Warren 
Court to jus til.}' its decisions with "neutral principles" -principles that transcend any imme-
diate result or danger presented by a particular case. Id. at 17. 
179 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
180 GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 654, 671. 
181 See id. at 666. 
182 See id. 
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that the Court was simply imposing its own judgment on the relative 
values at stake.183 
The problem with this explanation is that, by the time of Hand's 
Holmes Lectures, the Supreme Court had applied Brown in a series of 
decisions (many of them per curiam) outlawing racial discrimination 
or segregation in public beaches, parks, golf courses, buses, airports, 
restaurants, and courtrooms.184 In other words, the Court was treat-
ing Brown's prohibition of racial discrimination as an absolute; it was 
not simply second-guessing the values of the state legislatures. Hand 
never acknowledged, much less explained, whether these decisions in-
dicated that the Court had come around to his way of thinking or 
perhaps had agreed in effect with his reasoning all along. 
Gunther's defense of Hand's Holmes Lectures fails for other rea-
sons. First, Gunther maintains that "Hand was no doubt ... vulnera-
ble to Frankfurter's ceaseless advocacy because he was suffering from 
fatigue about the lectures."185 However, Hand had spent seven years 
working on and agonizing over the lectures.186 Even if he was suffer-
ing from fatigue, it is odd for Hand to have worked so hard to craft 
the lectures without taking the time to confirm that the state of the 
law was as he described it. 
Gunther further attributes the mistakes in Hand's lectures to 
Frankfurter's artifice on the ground that "Frankfurter never told 
Hand, and Hand was not a sufficiently careful follower of Supreme 
Court rulings to know, that the Supreme Court had in fact extended 
Brown very quickly and forcefully to areas well beyond the educational 
environment. "187 If true, this is a particularly shameful lapse for 
Hand, given that we would expect any good circuit judge, much less a 
great one, to follow the Court's docket (or at least to have had his law 
clerk-at that time, Ronald Dworkin-track it for him) 188 to ensure 
that his opinions were consistent with it.189 
183 See id. at 665-72. 
184 See id. at 670. 
185 Id. at 671. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 670. 
188 See id. at 671 n.*. 
189 Moreover, Hand, as depicted by Gunther, does not seem to have fully appreciated 
the fact that private law and constitutional law call for very different styles of adjudication. 
An especially revealing statement in the Holmes Lectures is Hand's suggestion that vigor-
ous judicial review of constitutional questions is" 'apt to interfere with [the] proper dis-
charge' of the judges' vital ... duties, especially the interpretation of statutes." Id. at 658 
(quoting LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 70-71 (1958)) (alteration in original). Hand, 
in other words, saw constitutional interpretation as less important than statutory interpre-
tation, and he counseled judges to conserve their energy for this higher task. Id. But he 
based this peculiar conclusion not on the text or structure of the Constitution (which 
establishes the opposite hierarchy between constitutional and statutory law}, but on his 
own exalted conception ofajudge's role. Id. at 658-59. 
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Another example of Gunther's tendency to depict Hand in an 
overly positive light is Gunther's exaggeration of the influence of 
Hand on modern freedom of speech law following his district court 
opinion in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten190 on modern freedom of 
speech law. In 1917, Congress, in the midst of the fervor over World 
War I, adopted the Espionage Act, which made statements critical of 
the war a crime and allowed the postmaster general to exclude from 
the mails periodicals containing antiwar statements. Under that au-
thority, the post office banned an issue of The Masses, a journal con-
taining several cartoons and articles depicting the war as a weapon of 
big business against the interests of workers. The case came before 
Hand, who knew he would damage his chances for promotion if he 
lifted the ban.191 Nonetheless he did so, in a controversial decision 
that remains his boldest defense of freedom of speech. Hand said 
that the First Amendment's guarantee means that even dangerous 
speech must not be prohibited or punished unless what is said consti-
tutes a direct incitement to crime, and that the Espionage Act should 
be interpreted subject to that limitation.192 Hand was promptly over-
ruled,193 and his reputation suffered.194 When he failed to convert 
Holmes to his view, 195 Hand abandoned it, calling it a toy boat that 
had not sailed far and must be taken out of the water.196 Neverthe-
less, Gunther maintains that four decades later in Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 197 "the Supreme Court announced its most speech-protective 
standard ever. And that standard is essentially an embracing of 
Hand's Masses approach."19S 
Gunther's assessment is unfounded for several reasons, besides 
Masses's prompt reversal. For one thing, Hand regarded his reasoning 
in Masses as flatly inconsistent with a long line of Supreme Court 
precedents, so he took a far less speech-protective approach in 1951 in 
deciding United States v. Dennis.199 In Dennis, Hand ironically felt him-
self bound to use Holmes's "clear and present danger" test200 in re-
viewing the conviction of Communist Party leaders, under the Smith 
Act, for conspiracy to advocate overthrowing the United States govern-
ment by force or violence. 201 Hand said that Congress might well 
190 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), reu'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). 
191 See GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 152. 
192 
193 
194 
195 
196 
197 
198 
199 
200 
201 
See id. at 157-60. 
See Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). 
See GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 152. 
Id. at 161-67. 
Id. at 600. 
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 152. 
183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
See GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 599-600. 
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think, in the midst of the cold war, that the threat of Communist vio-
lence did present a clear and present danger. Therefore, he upheld 
the conviction in language. The Supreme Court adopted Hand's lan-
guage-with Justice Black vigorously dissenting-when it affirmed the 
decision.202 Though Gunther defends Hand's decision as that of a 
good lower court judge following Supreme Court precedent,2os the 
decision is explained better as reflecting Hand's increasingly strong 
view that judges should not overrule political or moral judgments that 
other institutions have made. Indeed, Gunther suggested as much in 
a 1975 article: 
Perhaps most basic of all were Hand's growing doubts that courts 
could truly aid in preserving freedom of expression in times of cri-
sis. That skepticism was far deeper in his later years than it had 
been during World War I. By the time of his Holmes Lectures in 
1958, he had come to view the first amendment as one of a set of 
moral abjurations, not as ajudicially enforceable norm.204 
In any event, none of the three Brandenburg opinions cites Hand's 
opinion, nor did any of the briefs filed in the case. It is thus unlikely 
that any of the justices were actually aware of or persuaded by Masses 
in deciding Brandenburg.205 
IV 
THE QUESTION OF JUDICIAL GREATNESS 
Judicial greatness is often in the eye of the beholder. Many of the 
standards adopted for determining the greatness of a judge are 
desigued to ensure the selection of particular judges or to favor judges 
who reach certain substantive outcomes.2°6 The challenge for ajudi-
202 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951). 
203 GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 600. 
204 Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modem First Amendment Doctrine: 
Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 752 (1975) (citations omitted). Moreover, 
Brandenburg does not adopt the two most distinctive features of Hand's approach in Masses: 
(1) that consequences are irrelevant and (2) that speech to be punishable must explicitly 
advocate a violation of the law. See Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917); see also GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 160 n.*. 
205 In addition, one might expect that, because of his presence on the Supreme Court 
and his zeal for protecting the freedom ofspeech,Justice Black, notJudge Hand, should 
be regarded as the intellectual progenitor of Brandenburg. Although Newman discusses 
Justice Black's First Amendment jurisprudence at great length, he does not mention what, 
if anything, Black contributed to the Court's landmark decision in Brandenburg. The rea-
son for this omission is that by the time t..'le Court decided Brandenburg, Justice Brennan 
had taken over the intellectual reins of the Court, see supra note 137 and accompanying 
text, and Black's physical deterioration had become so acute that he played no role in the 
case except to write a paragraph-length concurring opinion. See supra notes 71-73 and 
accompanying text. 
206 For example, in suggesting creativity, intelligence, and frequency of citation as 
plausible yardsticks for measuring judicial greatness, see Posner, supra note 46, at 523-28, 
Judge Richard Posner has largely settled on standards that reflect best on himself. His 
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cial biographer interested in illuminating the significance of a sub-
ject's judicial performance is to explain the criteria for measuring the 
quality of the subject's performance in his most difficult or prominent 
cases. Either set of cases could be relevant for purposes of measuring 
the greatness of a judge. 
In the next two sections, I evaluate Gunther's, Jeffries's, and New-
man's depictions of their subjects' judicial performances in terms of 
two general criteria-the quality of a judge's decisions and the nature 
of a judge's temperament. It is fair to evaluate how well Gunther and 
Newman address the question of judicial greatness because they both 
present their subjects as unconditionally greatjurists.207 AlthoughJef:. 
fries studiously avoids labeling Powell as a great justice, he nonetheless 
suggests that Powell deserves special attention because he was an espe-
cially influential member of the Court during his tenure there. 208 
Hence, a reasonable inquiry is whether Jeffries successfully establishes 
this fact. 
A. The Quality of a Judge's Decisions 
One major criterion for measuring the greatness of a judge is the 
quality of his or her decisions. This standard encompasses various fac-
tors, including not just the correctness of a decision but also the rela-
tive craftsmanship, creativity, influence, and durability of a judge's 
opinions. In short, this criterion requires a comprehensive examina-
tion of how well a judge performed the task of deciding cases. 
One must undertake this inquiry, however, with sensitivity to the 
fact that judges are confined by what comes before them, particularly 
the timing or nature of the cases that they must decide. Lower court 
judges have the least control over their dockets; they must grapple 
application of economic reasoning to a wide variety of legal areas is certainly innovative; 
his intelligence is unquestioned; and his productivity is so vast that his cites to himself 
alone would place his frequency of citation ahead of many other judges. To be sure, 
within a limited range, Posner's three factors do reflect the quality of a judge's perform-
ance. So long as a judge remains sensitive to the need for stability, predictability, and 
continuity in the law, his or her creativity can lead to novel insights that bridge areas of the 
law previously considered separate or that clarify doctrine in some new way. Intelligence 
helps a judge master complex, technical areas of the law. Finally, frequency of citation, 
except citations of particularly controversial or universally condemned opinions, can show 
how seriously other members of the bench regard a particular judge's decisions. 
207 See, e.g., GUNTHER, supra note 1, at xv (describing Hand as being "numbered among 
a small group of truly great American judges of the twentieth century"); Newman, supra 
note 3, at xiv (recounting many of the accolades bestowed on Black at the end of his life 
and concluding with the judgment that Black was a "great man-whose accomplishments 
ranked him with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Martin Luther King, Jr., among contemporar-
ies, and on the bench with 'the great Chief justice' Jobn Marshall in the nineteenth cen-
tury and, in the early twentieth, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Louis D. Brandeis"). 
208 See, e.g.,]EFFRIES, supra note 2, at 12 (suggesting that the Burger Court's "most char-
acteristic voice, the one that proved most often decisive, was that of its most reluctant 
member," Justice Powell). 
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·with a wide range of cases of varying complexity and social impor-
tance. Some judges also confront cases with significant social and 
political ramifications that may overshadow everything else the judge 
did. In trying to measure judicial quality in some neutral fashion, 
evaluators need to appreciate that the candidates for judicial great-
ness have rarely had to make the same decisions under the same con-
ditions, nor have they faced identical challenges. A judicial 
biographer needs to present a representative cross section of the sub-
ject's decisions and the relative circumstances in which that judge 
toiled if the aim is to arrive at an understanding of the quality of a 
judge throughout his or her lifetime on the bench. If, however, the 
aim is to cultivate appreciation for the quality of a judge's perform-
ance in his or her most difficult or prominent cases, then a judicial 
biographer must explain the lasting significance of the judge's contri-
butions to those cases and the criteria for making these evaluations. 
A judicial biographer also needs to understand how the subject 
transcended, was defined by, or failed to move with the times. For 
instance, Sheldon Novick-but not Gunther-reports Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg's recollection "that when she graduated from law 
school with distinguished honors, Hand said he could not hire her 
because his language was too 'salty' for a woman."209 David Garrow 
adds, however, that Hand's politics could sometimes be quite progres-
sive for his era, noting that " [ w] hile Gunther does not mention that 
Hand was an extremely early supporter of a woman's legal right to 
choose abortion, he does detail how . . . Hand had publicly opined 
that homosexuality 'is not a matter that people should be put in 
prison about.' "210 Hand, like any prominent historical fignre, must 
be· understood ·within the context of his times and yet stand ready as a 
person and judge to be measured by contemporary or more enlight-
ened standards . 
. . Measured against such standards, Gunther conveys Hand as the 
consummate judicial craftsman, if judicial craftsmanship is under-
stood as the ability to construct eloquent, persuasive legal arguments, 
to draw meaningful and imaginative analogies from related fields of 
law or human endeavor, to clarify muddled legal doctrines, to give 
209 Sheldon M. Novick, Judged by History: What Makes a Great Judge-His Reasoning or His 
Vzsioni', LA TIMES, May 22, 1994, at 2 (book review). To be sure, Hand's law clerks have 
proven to be a distinguished lot, even though Gunther mentions only a few-namely, him-
self, see GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 620-21; Paul Bender (now Deputy Solicitor General in 
the Clinton administration); see id. at 676; Ronald Dworkin (now professor of law at New 
York and Oxford Universities); see id. at 671 n.*; Elliot Richardson (the person who has 
thus far headed more different departments in the federal government than any other 
individual); see id. at 604; and Louis Henkin (distinguished international and constitutional 
law scholar at Columbia Law School); see id. at 535. 
210 David]. Garrow, DoingJustice, THE NATION, Feb. 27, 1995, at 278, 278-79 (citation 
omitted in the original). 
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scrupulous attention to the facts, and to master the technical aspects 
of a case. Judge Hand's longevity enabled him to display his skills as a 
district and appellate judge in an amazingly wide range of subject mat-
ters, including antitrust, bankruptcy, maritime law, patent and copy-
right law, obscenity, immigration, criminal law and procedure, civil 
procedure, trademark, unfair competition, freedom of speech, con-
flicts of laws, tax, negligence, and contracts. Gunther does not cover 
Hand's opinions in all of these fields, but he covers enough of them to 
confirm Judge Henry Friendly's apt assessment (quoted twice by Gun-
ther) that" '[Hand's] stature as ajudge stemmed not so much from 
the few great cases that inevitably came to him over the years . . . as 
from the great way in which he dealt with a multitude of little cases, 
covering almost every subject in the legal lexicon.' "211 
Not infrequently, though, Hand would go beyond the issues 
strictly raised in a case, pepper an opinion with dicta, and meander far 
too much in his reasoning. For example, Hand's all-important Al-
coa?-12 opinion arguably displays some of those shortcomings. Indeed, 
Hand's own Second Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately rejected Alcoa 
in an opinion by Judge Irving Kaufman (whose appointment to that 
court Hand twice blocked).213 According to Judge Kaufman, Alcoa 
was "a litigant's wishing well, into which, it sometimes seems, one may 
peer and find nearly anything he wishes."214 
Yet, on balance, Judge Hand's opinions, even when they are as 
pedantic as Alcoa, reflect his meticulous craftsmanship. As Gunther 
explains, "(d]uring most of his years on the bench, Hand confronted 
a body of law that ranged from useless generalizations to annoying 
technicalities. Much of his reputation was gained by his skill in laying 
bare in intelligible language what was truly at stake, and in castigating 
obscuring platitudes."215 Alcoa itself remains impressive because of 
Hand's scrupulousness in disclosing the thought processes of an intel-
ligent judge at work. One sees him considering all sides of the issue of 
when a monopoly's exercise of market power violates the antitrust 
211 GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 145, 292 (alteration in original) (quoting Henry J. 
Friendly, Learned Hand: An Expressian from the Second Circuit, 29 BROOK. L. REv. 6, 13 
(1962)). To be sure, Judge Hand's prominence is also to some extent a function of the 
timing and circumstances of bis rise to judicial prominence. Learned Hand became a 
district judge and later a circuit judge in New York City just as it became the center of the 
legal and commercial world. Moreover, as one of the first high-ranking Harvard graduates 
on the federal bench in this century, judge Hand joined an elite fraternity that included 
during his tenure justices Brandeis, Holmes and Frankfurter. These judges helped to culti-
vate each other's work and image. 
212 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
213 GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 648-52. 
214 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 444 u.s. 1093 (1980). 
215 GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 313. 
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laws, weighing the arguments frankly and defending his conclusions 
in a reasoned manner. 
Gunther attempts to ground Hand's greatness as ajudge in how 
he handled several important constitutional law opinions and numer-
ous other matters across a wide spectrum of substantive areas. The 
problem, though not fatal by any means to Gunther's quest, is that 
Gunther does not account for all of Hand's landmark opinions. In-
deed, Gunther fails to reconcile Hand's apparent preference for judi-
cial deference as expressed in his Holmes Lectures with the judicial 
activism evident in many of Hand's most famous common law and 
statutory opinions. The latter cases, exemplified by Carroll Towinlf16 
and The TJ. Hooper,217 do not fit neatly into Gunther's central thesis 
that Hand was a paragon of judicial restraint and that he never en-
gaged in judicial activism or imposed his own social or economic 
principles. 
For instance, in Carroll Towing, Hand considered the commercial 
and private circumstances of a maritime barge accident and con-
cluded that it was fair to require barge owners to have someone 
aboard to sound a warning in case of trouble.21S Thus, he reduced 
the damages to which the barge owners would have otherwise been 
entitled. In taking the position that economic practicality drove legal 
duty, Hand laid the groundwork for understanding negligence in 
terms of economic reasoning.219 
Moreover, Hand's opinion in The T J. Hooper also conflicts with 
Gunther's image of Hand. As Professor Morton Horwitz has claimed, 
the case represents a revolution in judicial attitudes toward the sanc-
tity of private business decisions, for in it "Hand decided that he could 
ignore the almost universal custom of tng boat owners not to use ra-
dios and hold therefore that such a failure constituted negligence."220 
Although The T J. Hooper and Carroll Towing displayed an activist 
and innovative Judge Hand, this is not to say that Gunther's Hand and 
the Hand of these two cases are irreconcilable. When Hand employed 
economic theory in the service of judicial activism, he was arguably 
216 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
217 The TJ. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932). 
218 Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 174. 
219 As Professor (and now Circuit Judge) Richard Posner explained, "Hand was adum-
brating, perhaps unwittingly, an economic meaning of negligence .... If the cost of safety 
measures or of curtailment-whichever cost is lower-exceeds the benefit in accident 
avoidance to be gained by incurring that cost, society would be better off, in economic 
terms, to forego accident prevention. • .. If, on the other hand, the benefits of accident 
avoidance exceed the costs of prevention, society is better off if those costs are incurred 
and the accident averted." Richard A Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 
32-33 (1972). 
220 RICHARD A EPSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ToRTS 171 (4th ed. 1984) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting unpublished lecture of Professor Horwitz). 
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deviating from or perhaps improving on legal precedents. He was not 
invalidating statutes, as he had so often criticized the Supreme Court 
for doing. Moreover, Hand may have thought that the sort of creativ-
ity he exercised in cases like The T J. Hooper and Carroll Towingwere off 
limits in constitutional cases, since legislatures could not correct over-
zealous judges in constitutional law. But Gunther does not attempt 
any such reconciliation. Nor does he suggest that Hand's judicial 
decisionmaking might have been more complicated or less consistent 
than it sometimes appeared. 
1n any event, the frequency with which other judges have cited 
Hand-a criterion recommended by Judge Posner as one measure of 
judicial greatness-reflects the respect other judges have for the qual-
ity and thoughtfulness of his opinions.22I As Judge Posner shows, the 
frequency with which judges in Hand's day and even now rely on his 
reasoning in the varied, often mundane areas of the law that make up 
the bulk of lower federal courts' dockets confirm Hand's stature. It is 
extraordinary for a lower federal court judge to be cited with such 
deference more than thirty years after his death. 222 
Despite his ideological differences with Judge Hand, Justice Black 
should also be commended for his judicial craftsmanship. Whereas 
Judge Hand's opinions are grandiloquent, Justice Black's opinions are 
unusually clear, succinct, and passionate. Black deliberately wrote for 
public consumption. 223 As he once explained, he wrote his opinions 
so that "my uncle down on the farm plowing the fields can read 
them."224 Black's study of Supreme Court history and his keen polit-
ical instincts convinced him that he should make his opinions accessi-
ble to the common people whom he saw as the ultimate beneficiary of 
the Court's work.225 
Justice Black's greatest legacy as a jurist can be found in his distin-
guished constitutional law decisions. On a nine-member court in 
221 See Posner, supra note 46, at 536-40. For a similar appraisal, see John P. Frank, The 
Great judge, 108 HARv. L REv. 931, 945 (1995) (book review). 
222 Even Justice Black, who did not agree with Judge Hand's views on judicial restraint, 
addressed Judge Hand's constitutional arguments whenever possible, see NEWMAN, supra 
note 3, at 487, 495, acknowledged Judge Hand as having "'few superiors in eloquent 
graphic expressions,'" id. at 495 (quoting Letter from Hugo L. Black to Milton Handler 
(May 13, 1963)), and quoted him when it suited Black's purposes. See id. at 558. 
223 See id. at 276. 
224 Id. at 292 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Newman's Interview with 
Hugo L. Black); see also id. at 325 (discussing Black's clear writing style). 
225 See id. at 292. Hence, Black was one of the firstJustices to have been widely covered 
by the press, and that coverage, in turn, increased his notoriety with the populace. See id. 
at 276 (quoting from an interview with Judge Calabresi who claims that Heywood Broun 
once remarked that "Black is certainly popular with the newspaper men .•. because he 
recently wrote a dissent in English as plain and simple and clear as a good running story on 
the first page. And, naturally, reporters take to those who speak their own language. And 
it is a finer tongue than that invented by Mr. Blackstone'"). 
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which it is sometimes difficult to assess individual contributions, it is 
clear thatJustice Black, through a mixture oflongevity, forceful rea-
soning, persistent advocacy, and strikingly clear prose, wrote or engi-
neered some of the most significant constitutional decisions of this 
century. He helped to secure the constitutional foundations of the 
New Deal and the incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights against 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. He also set the Court 
on its current paths in the areas of criminal procedure, school deseg-
regation, voting rights, freedom of speech, the commerce clause, and 
freedom of religion. Even at his worst, Justice Black left an indelible 
imprint on constitutional law, as reflected by his catastrophic opinion 
in Korematsu,226 in which he recognized that any classification based 
on race was "suspect" and therefore must be subjected to the "most 
rigid scrutiny" and upheld only if justified by a "public necessity. "227 
His arguments against substantive due process are among the most 
forceful yet made, and he kept the Court honest by repeatedly insist-
ing on the need to square any constitutional decision with the text of 
the Constitution.22s 
Unlike Newman and Gunther, Jeffries, for good reason, says little 
about the quality of Powell's craftsmanship, except to emphasize that 
Justice Powell often crafted his opinions in such a way as to secure his 
occupancy of the middle ground.229 To be sure, at their best,Justice 
Powell's opinions reflect his thoughtful, cautious, and intelligent iden-
tification and weighing of the competing interests at stake. Neverthe-
less, many of Powell's more important or prominent swing votes 
turned on his identification of a nebulous point as a middle ground 
that later failed to please almost all of the constituencies interested in 
his opinion or left lower courts or legislatures without clear guidance 
on how to sufficiently proceed.2so 
226 Korematsu v. United,States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
227 Id. at 216. 
228 Of course, some scholars have criticized Justice Black's constitutional jurispru-
dence. For example, Professor G. Edward White has characterized Black as " 'idiosyncratic 
to the point of eccentricity', with a 'theory of constitutional interpretation that was both 
bizarrely rigid ... and mysteriously flexible.'" Garrow, supra note 144, at 280 (citation 
omitted in original). Professor Michael Klarman has identified "the many glaring incon-
sistencies inJustice Black's constitutional jurisprudence." Michael Klarman, Book Review, 
12 LAw & HIST. REv. 399, 405 (1994) (reviewing HowARD BALL & PHILUP J. CooPER, OF 
PowER AND RIGHT: HuGo L. BLAcK, WILUAM 0. DouGLAS, AND AMERICA's CoNSTITUTIONAL 
REvoLUTION (1992); MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FEux FRANKFURTER: juDICIAL REsTRAINr AND INDI-
VIDUAL LIBERTIES (1991); and TINsLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN MARsHALL HARLAN: GREAT Drs. 
SENTER OF THE WARREN CouRT (1992)). Moreover, Klarman has claimed that Black's 
voting record during his final six years on the Court "can only be described as reactionary." 
Id. at 401. 
229 JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 561. 
230 This aspect of Powell's decisionmaking is reflected in a quote from Justice Powell's 
first law clerk, now Judge]. Harvie Wilkinson, with which Jeffries ends Powell's biography: 
1632 CORNEU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1595 
Moreover, Justice Powell's contributions to the six areas of law 
evaluated in Jeffries's book231 do not firmly establish the lasting signif-
icance of his opinions. As previously noted,232 Jeffries recounts that 
Justice Powell has renounced or condemned his decisions in three of 
the six areas (sexual equality, the death penalty, and abortion) Jeffries 
chooses as his focus. Further, Justice Powell did not write at all in the 
fourth (Watergate)-the Court's sole opinion in Nixon.233 
In the two remaining areas-desegregation and affirmative ac-
tion-Powell's contributions in the form ofwritten opinions needs to 
be put in perspective. His reasoning either did not command a major-
ity, as in &gents ofthe University of California v. Bakke,234 and thus had 
awkward precedential value; he did not write at all;235 or he wrote 
inconsequential dissents.236 Even if Jeffries is right in claiming that 
the chief virtue of Powell's Bakke opinion is that it helped to preserve 
some form of affirmative action,237 he can, as Jeffries implies, still be 
criticized for reaching out to decide the constitutional issue when he 
could have decided the case on statutory grounds and thus followed 
the basic rule of avoiding constitutional issues whenever a narrower 
alternative is available.238 Justice Powell's performances in these cases 
also reflect his lifelong ambivalence about how much courts could 
meaningfully do to achieve racial justice. This ambivalence remains, 
Some of his votes are not easy to reconcile. Some of his theory is not seam-
lessly consistent. ... For those who seek a comprehensive vision of constitu-
tional law, Justice Powell will not have provided it. [But, for] those who 
seek a perspective grounded in realism and leavened by decency, conscien-
tious in detail and magnanimous in spirit, solicitous of personal dignity and 
protective of the public trust, there will never be a better Justice. 
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. P(JU)ell, Jr., 101 HAR.v. L. REv. 417, 420 
(1987), quoted in JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 562. 
231 See supra note 23 and accon:tpanying text. 
232 See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text. 
233 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 381-89. 
234 438 u.s. 265 (1978). 
235 See JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 312-17. 
236 See id. at 308, 329. 
237 See id. at 500. 
238 Jeffries notes that during a five-month period in which the rest of the Court waited 
for Justice Blackmun to make up his mind about which approach to endorse in Bakke, 
Chief Justice Warren Burger proposed that: 
[Powell] join a narrow opinion striking down the Davis program[, which 
had set up a quota for minority admissions to its medical school,] and leave 
it at that. After all, it was customary to decide one case at a time. There was 
no reason Powell had to go beyond these facts. And the opinion could hint 
broadly, as Burger himself believed, that milder preferences of the sort 
practiced at Harvard would eventually be permitted. 
Id. at 489. Jeffries suggests that Powell declined to agree because Powell thought the Court 
should " 'speak out clearly and unambiguously' " on the constitutional issue in the case. 
Id. (citation omitted in original). For a classic statement of the general rule regarding 
judicial avoidance of constitutional questions when other grounds for decisions exist, see 
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
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as much as anything else, a distinguishing feature of Justice Powell's 
sixteen years on the Court. 239 
239 In the areas not covered by Jeffries, justice Powell often cast seemingly inconsistent 
votes, which reflect a more conservative, perhaps even reactionary Powell than the Powell 
depicted by Jeffries. Powell's votes in several establishment clause cases, for example, are 
either hard to reconcile or turn on subtle distinctions that did not persuade other Justices. 
In Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), Powell joined the majority in upholding the 
constitutionality of a Minnesota statute that provided a tax deduction for parents whose 
children attended public or private schools. The Court treated the statute as secular in 
purpose and neutral in effect. However, in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), the 
Court struck down a joint federal-state program that provided funds to public and private 
(including sectarian) schools to pay the salaries of public school teachers who provided 
supplemental and remedial instruction to economically disadvantaged students. Powell's 
concurrence emphasized that the program was an impermissible subsidy and that although 
the subsidy provided only indirect support to parochial schools, the program would cause a 
great deal of political friction in a state like New York with diverse religious populations. 
!d. at 416 (Powell,]., concurring). But Powell joined the majority in Witters v. Washington 
Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), in which the Court upheld a statute that 
provided vocational rehabilitation assistance to a blind person pursuing a bible studies 
degree at a Christian college in preparation for a career as a minister. While the majority 
opinion stressed the indirect nature of the subsidy, see id. at 487, Powell interpreted Mueller 
v. Allen to mean that "state programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational assist-
ance to a class defined without reference to religion do not violate" the establishment 
clause. ld. at 490-91 (Powell,]., concurring). If, however, Powell's statement in Witter.s 
reflects the standard Powell applied in establishment clause cases, it is unclear how either 
the statute in Fellon satisfied this standard or how Powell's focus on political friction in 
Fellon was consistent with it. 
Powell's conservatism was especially apparent in federal habeas cases, which clearly fall 
within Jeffries's expertise, and yet are conspicuously absent from his biography of Powell. 
Beginning with his concurring opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 
(1973), Powell led the Court in restricting the scope of issues cognizable on federal habeas 
review to those strictly impacting on a defendant's innocence or guilt. For example, in his 
majority opinion in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), Powell emphasized a lack of 
deterrent effect on police behavior as one reason for not finding Fourth Amendment ex-
clusionary rule claims cognizable on federal habeas review absent a showing that the trial 
court denied the defendant a full and fair opportunity to adjudicate those claims. !d. at 
494-95. Powell's Schneckloth opinion and his concurrence in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 
(1979)-in which Powell argued that racial discrimination in grand jury selection should 
not be coguizable on federal habeas review-stressed the lack of impact habeas claims have 
on the reliability of the results (the defendant's guilt or innocence) reached at trial. ld. at 
586-87. Justice Powell's suggestions that "innocence" should be a siguificant factor relevant 
to the scope of habeas review resurfaced in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986), in 
the context of a habeas application by a state prisoner who had raised the identical issue in 
a previous habeas petition. Powell's habeas opinions reflect his desire to restrict federal 
jurisdiction in order to lighten federal court dockets, to reduce a criminal defendant's 
chances to elude punishment for his or her crimes, and to protect the autonomy of state 
courts. Powell's concerns about protecting state governments from federal encroachment 
also led him to cast the pivotal vote in the Court's first opinion in over 40 years to strike 
down a congressional enactment under the commerce clause. See National League of Cit-
ies v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Powell later dissented in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), which overruled National League of Cities. 
Finally, Powell's corporate opinions raised as many questions as they answered. His 
opinion in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), for instance, left unresolved the 
issue of whether a noninsider tippee (like a securities analyst) who received information 
from an internal corporate source could be liable for insider trading. Powell's next major 
corporate opinion, Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), left additional questions unresolved, 
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B. Judicial Temperament 
Another criterion for determining judicial greatness is the nature 
of a judge's temperament, including the quality of a judge's interac-
tion with colleagues and his or her open-mindedness, patience, even-
handedness, disposition to listen to all sides of an issue, leadership, 
personality, and character. Character is an especially important 
source ofajudge's moral or politicaljudgments about the role of the 
judiciary in American society.240 Judicial temperament also requires 
that a judge have the courage of his or her convictions; ideally, a 
judge should be sufficiently independent to withstand public pressure 
to reach unpopular decisions. 
Judge Hand's temperament, for instance, was a mixed bag. He 
had a lifelong interest in legal reform, as evidenced by his support for 
the American Law Institute, of which he was a founder.241 Moreover, 
Hand's self-doubt seems to have driven him to work harder and more 
carefully than any other judge and, combined with his skepticism, to 
rethink every case from the ground up. In the estimation of a former 
clerk, Professor Ronald Dworkin, Judge Hand "worked· in the same 
laborious way until he died; as if each case, no matter how complex or 
trivial, exciting or mundane, was the most important a judge might 
ever confront."242 
Yet, Judge Hand's irritability has led no less a judge than Frank 
Coffin of the First Circuit to observe that " [ t] he very fact that robe and 
bench vest a judge with near absolute power over counsel ought to 
compel a restrained, relaxed, and civil demeanor. Learned Hand, a 
role model in so many ways, can stand not being emulated in this sole 
respect."243 Moreover, Hand can be faulted for having lacked the 
courage of his convictions on the one significant occasion he had as a 
judge to thwart the rise of McCarthyism in Dennis.244 In spite of the 
outrage and concern he had expressed about McCarthyism in pri-
such as what mental element is required to impose insider trading liability on a noninsider 
tippee. Many wonder whether it is sufficient that the tippee knew or should have known of 
the tipper's breach of fiduciary duty, as Powell suggested, id. at 660, or whether intent to 
deceive or defraud the investor is necessary, as Powell indicated, id. at 663 n.23. In at-
tempting to reconcile the two, Powell suggested that scienter is irrelevant to the questions 
of whether and when a tippee acquires a duty to either disclose information he or she has 
acquired or abstain from trading .. Id. While Powell's suggestion may make sense, his opin-
ion also notes that there can be no lOb-5 liability without scienter, see id., indicating that 
negligence may not be enough for tippee liability. 
240 See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CoNFIRMATION MESs: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL M-
POINTMENTS PROCESS 151-55 (1994); Gerhardt, supra note 61, at 55-63. 
241 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 410-14. 
242 Ronald Dworkin, Mr. Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1994, at 17, 18 (book review). 
243 Frank M. Coffin, Reclaiming a Great Judge's Legacy, 46 ME. L. REv. 377, 391 (1994) 
(reviewing GuNTHER, supra note 1). 
244 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
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vate,245 Hand upheld the criminal convictions of Communist Party 
leaders for advocating the overthrow of the government by force or 
violence.246 Yet, Hand himself thought, as he said in a letter to Ber-
nard Berenson shortly after deciding Dennis, that the prosecution was 
a tactical mistake.247 This statement is hardly consistent with Hand's 
claim that the threat was clear and present. If there was a clear and 
present danger posed by the defendants' speech, it is not likely to 
have left much room for prosecutors to exercise discretion on 
whether to initiate a prosecution. 
Judge Hand's Dennis opinion also stands in marked contrast to 
Justice Black's powerful dissent to the Court's decision to affirm 
Hand.248 Newman shows that Black's greatest virtue was also his great-
est flaw: he rarely compromised his principles, which included, inter 
alia, his own "political survival. "249 As Justice Frankfurter once noted, 
Justice Black "could have done much more, gotten more majorities, 
but ... he didn't because he wanted more to move the Court than to 
moderate his position."250 In Newman's estimation, Black's "charac-
ter" and tenacity explain his accomplishments.25I These attributes 
combined with his longevity, account as much as anything for his suc-
cess at seeing more of his dissents turn into doctrine than those of any 
other Justice in this century.252 These qualities are captured inJustice 
Arthur Goldberg's recollection ofJustice Black: "When Hugo was in 
agreement, he was a sober brother .... When he was in disagreement, 
he was a terrible and vigorous adversary. He was a gut fighter. It took 
much independence to stand up to him. "253 
245 GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 578-92. 
246 Dennis, 183 F.2d at 234. 
247 See GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 603. 
248 See NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 402-04. 
249 Id. at 128. 
250 Id. at 519 (Interview with David Ginsburg in which Ginsburg recalled these words 
attributed to Frankfurter). 
251 Id. at xiv. 
252 See id. at 537; see also Maurice Kelman, The Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 
227, 251. 
253 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 546 (citation omitted in the original). On the Goldberg-
Black relationship, Newman relates that: 
Black was perfectly friendly with Arthur Goldberg without fancying him at 
all. His aggressiveness, personally and intellectually, put Hugo off some-
what; he found Goldberg abrasive and arrogant. . . . Black regarded 
Goldberg, and to some extent Brennan, as apostates, and that upset him, 
for he liked apostles: Brennan and Goldberg, he felt, would not stop until 
they achieved their social goals. [Moreover,] Goldberg resembled north-
em liberals whom Black had always distrusted; the cultural gulf between 
them and him was too large to be bridged. 
Id. at 564. 
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Yet, Black said and did things that, as ChiefJustice Warren once 
remarked, failed to "represent the better part of his nature. "254 This 
dark side mars Black's claim to judicial greatness. For example, New-
man notes that "the aftermath of Brown?55 saw a rampant lawlessness 
... sweeping the South" and that "in the [sit-in] cases Black was re-
sponding to the imperative of the return to legal processes."256 Of 
course, it is important to remember that white segregationists almost 
exclusively created the atmosphere of "rampant lawlessness" that was 
sweeping the South, while Black focused his judicial antipathy largely 
upon the nonviolent blacks. Newman also relates many of Black's in-
tolerant comments: that "[t]hese street parades should be 
stopped,"257 that "it was time to clamp down on the Negroes,"25B that 
it was "high-time the Court handed down a decision against the Ne-
groes;"259 and that "I think it is an indicia of slavery to make me associ-
ate with people I do not want to associate with."260 As Newman 
further concedes, "[f] ormerly [Black] had treated dissenters as heroes 
indispensable to progress, who helped the country live up to its high-
est aspirations. Now he disp~ged protest groups and their leaders: 
he considered them ambitious, misinformed, dangerous agitators. "261 
These disparaging comments were made by the same person who, 
forty years earlier, had talked about "niggers," joined the Klan, and 
denounced immigration.262 
Whereas Justice Black and especially Judge Hand could be irrita-
ble on the bench, Justice Powell was a model of judicial civility. Pow-
ell's grace under fire, equanimity, "respectful attention to the views" 
of his colleagues,263 and patience in listening to all sides of an issue 
distinguish his judicial tenure. Justice Powell's decision to leave the 
Court once he was aware of "his own diminishing strength"264 demon-
strates extraordinary public spiritedness and uncommon awareness of 
his personal limitations. This mind-set stands in marked contrast to 
Justice Black's andJudge Hand's insistence to remain on the bench 
long after their best days. 265 
254 Id. at 549. 
255 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
256 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 550-51. 
257 Id. at 542 (according to Justice Douglas, Black made this statement during a confer-
ence over Salter v. City of jackson, 374 U.S. 818 (1963). See WILLIAM 0. DouGlAS, THE 
DouGlAS LETrERS: SELE:criONS FROM THE PRIVATE PAPERS oF juSTICE WILLIAM 0. DouGlAS 
169-71 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1987). 
258 NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 542 (citations omitted in original). 
259 Id. (citations omitted in original). 
260 Id. at 544 (citation omitted in original). 
261 Id. at 55!. 
262 
263 
264 
265 
See supra notes 140-54 and accompanying text. 
JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 561. 
Id. at 543. 
See Frank, supra note 221, at 945. 
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These traits, however, must be weighed against Powell's deliber-
ate decision not to influence the outcome of decisions by trying to 
persuade his colleagues to change positions. Mter all, appellate 
courts, especially the Supreme Court, are supposed to function to a 
significant degree as collegial decisionmakers rather than collections 
of individual judges writing separate opinions. Powell's choice, 
though grounded in his honest belief that a judge must not be pres-
sured to compromise his convictions,266 cost him the chance to exer-
cise greater leadership in directing the Court's deliberations. In 
Jeffries's opinion, this decision more than anything else explains Pow-
ell's "surprising ineffectiveness as a Court politician."267 However, 
Powell's choice might also have reflected his lack of confidence in the 
steadfastness of his convictions-a view reinforced by Powell's public 
renouncements of several key votes after his retirement.26B His deci-
sion seems to have been a characteristically overly cautious attempt to 
protect his integrity. However, Powell failed to realize that having the 
courage of one's convictions includes testing them against others' be-
liefs to determine their relative strength. 
VI 
ILLUMINATING jUDICIAL SELECTION 
Judicial biographies tend to presume a subject whose judicial ap-
pointment seems, at least in retrospect, to have been a foregone con-
clusion. The process by which the subject became a judge seems 
secondary to the general point of a judicial biography. Yet, judicial 
biographies can shed light on the natures of judicial decisionmaking 
and judicial selection. 
In fact, judicial selection is akin to trying to write a judicial biogra-
phy in reverse: it requires figuring out beforehand how someone will 
perform as a judge. Hence, the final challenge for a judicial biogra-
pher is to explain how and why the subject was selected to serve as a 
judge. Judicial biographers should consider whether the trait(s) for 
which their subjects would later become famous were apparent at the 
time of, or were the reasons for, the subjects' nominations. A related 
issue is whether the means used to select Justices Black and Powell 
and Judge Hand reveal a model for choosing judges or predicting ju-
dicial behavior. The first section below examines Gunther's,Jeffries's, 
and Newman's descriptions of the selection processes that led to the 
appointments of their respective subjects. The second section consid-
266 See supra text accompanying note 112. 
267 JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 303 (describing Powell's repeated failure to persuade a 
majority of Justices to abandon the Court's distinction between de jure and de facto 
segregation). 
268 See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text. 
1638 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1595 
ers the lessons these biographies teach for selecting judges in the 
future. 
A. The Appointments of Justices Black and Powell and Judge 
Hand 
Newman, Jeffries, and Gunther fully explain the reasons their re-
spective subjects were chosen as judges. Newman and Jeffries reveal 
that the selection processes for Black's and Powell's appointments as 
Justices were far more thorough than for Hand's appointments as a 
district and circuit courtjudge. The obvious reason for the disparate 
treatment is that a Supreme CourtJustice has greater authority. In-
deed, Gunther explains that when Hand was being considered for the 
Supreme Court, he became subject to the vagaries of the more com-
plex selection process.269 
These biographies also reveal that Justices Black and Powell had 
different attitudes about being appointed to the Supreme Court than 
did Judge Hand. Interestingly, neither Black nor Powell lusted for the 
Court. Newman suggests, for instance, thatJustice Black's real ambi-
tion was to become President of the United States.270 Black initially 
resisted being nominated to the Court because he thought it would 
impede realization of this desire;271 he even continued to consider 
running for the presidency after having been appointed to the 
Court.272 For his part, Powell resisted a Court appointment until the 
last moment. In Jeffries's opinion, Powell was not sure he could suc-
ceed there, and in any event, was quite content with his station in 
life.273 Hand, by contrast, lusted for his judicial appointments: Hand 
sought a district court judgeship to escape the boredom of private 
practice,274 then sought an appointment to the Second Circuit to 
avoid the tedium of being a trial judge. 275 He later sought a Supreme 
Court appointment in vain to give him the recognition that he and his 
friends thought he deserved.276 
All three biographers provide fascinating details on the historical 
and political circumstances under which their subjects became judges. 
For example, Newman notes that President Roosevelt settled on Black 
as his initial Supreme Court appointment only after his first choice, 
Senate Majority Leader Joseph Robinson, had died. 277 Roosevelt 
269 
270 
271 
272 
273 
274 
275 
276 
277 
GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 418-21, 553-70. 
NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 306-07, 309 n.*. 
Id. at 235. 
Id. at 306. 
JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 1-9. 
GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 107. 
Id. at 257-61. 
Id. at 425-28, 559, 566-67. 
NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 219. 
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chose Black in part because he wanted to get back at the Senate for 
opposing his Court-packing plan and New Deallegislation,278 both of 
which Black zealously supported as a senator.279 Roosevelt admired 
Black's loyalty and concluded that the Senate would ultimately con-
firm him because of its "sense of collegiality."280 Newman describes 
how newspaper reports that Black had been a Ku Klux Klan member 
stalled his nomination.281 Nevertheless, Roosevelt stood by the nomi-
nation, Black did not testify, and the Senate confirmed him by a wide 
margin.282 Later, in 1941, Roosevelt did not seriously consider Black 
for Chief Justice out of fear that it "would revive the Klan issue."283 In 
1946, Truman abandoned any thought of appointing Black (with 
whom he had served in the Senate) as Chief Justice because he felt it 
would magnify the rift on the Court due to the intense feud between 
Justices Black andJackson.284 
Jeffries suggests that President Nixon and his Attorney General, 
John Mitchell, nominated Justice Powell for several reasons. First, 
Powell's distinguished record as a corporate lawyer and in civic affairs 
ensured his nomination would run cover for the concurrent, but 
more controversial, nomination of William Rehnquist. 285 Second, 
Powell's personal background and public stands as President of the 
ABA in favor of toughening criminal sanctions reflected conservative 
political biases.286 Third, Powell was born and bred in Virginia. 
Nixon and Mitchell ·wanted a Southerner because the South had sup-
ported Nixon, and Justice Black's retirement left the Court without a 
Southerner.287 Finally, Powell lacked a significant paper trail (in the 
form of opinions or political activities) or personal problems that had 
torpedoed two ofNixon's previous nominees, circuitjudges Clement 
Haynesworth and Harold Carswell. 288 The only stumbling block to 
Powell's confirmation was his alleged failure to do more to facilitate 
desegregation. Powell overcame the allegations, however, through 
the endorsements of various civil rights leaders.289 
Even though Hand's judicial nominations were subjected to less 
scrutiny than those of Justices Black and Powell, Gunther shows that 
Hand did not have an easy time securing a judicial appointment. 
278 
279 
280 
Id. at 236, 239. 
Id. at 210-13. 
Id. at 239. 
281 Id. at 239-41. 
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Id. at 242. 
Id. at 307. 
Id. at 34344. 
JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 9-10, 232-33. 
Id. at 1-2, 210. 
Id. at 1. 
Id. at 229. 
Id. at 235. 
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Hand failed in his first effort to obtain a district court appointment in 
1907, when Congress failed to create a new district court judgeship for 
the Southern District of New York.290 Two years later, Congress au-
thorized a new judgeship, which Hand sought and received. 291 As 
Gunther explains, the key to Hand's appointment was that he knew a 
number of influential lawyers in the New York bar, particularly the 
well-connected Charles C. Burlingham, who convinced President 
Taft's Attorney General, George Wickersham, to push Hand's nomi-
nation through the administration and the Senate.292 Because Hand's 
initial judicial appointment was to the district court, those who sup-
ported his nomination but did not know him had low expectations for 
his likely performance. The lowered expectations helped Hand, who 
claimed, "1 was never any good as a lawyer. I didn't have any success, 
at all."293 Ironically, President Taft, who became a staunch proponent 
of substantive due process, did not worry much at the time about 
Hand's likely judicial ideology, despite Hand's opposition to substan-
tive due process as expressed in an essay published one year earlier in 
the Harvard Law Review.294 
The question most often asked about Hand is why he was never 
appointed to the Supreme Court. Gunther answers this question 
fully. According to Gunther, a key factor was that Judge Hand alien-
ated Taft by publicly supporting Teddy Roosevelt, instead of Taft, for 
President in 1912 and by criticizing Taft's and others' support for sub-
stantive due process.295 Although Taft became Chief Justice in 1921, 
he remained the major voice on Republican nominations to the 
Supreme Court until 1930. Hence, Hand stood no chance of being 
appointed to the Court during that period. In 1922, for instance, 
Chief Justice Taft wrote to President Warren Harding requesting that 
he block any consideration of Hand to fill a vacancy. 296 Taft decided 
in 1924 not to oppose President Calvin Coolidge's nomination of 
Hand to the Second Circuit because Taft believed that Hand did not 
pose any threat to him nor to substantive due process as an appellate 
judge.297 When Taft retired from the Court in 1930, President Her-
bert Hoover caved in to conservative pressure and appointed Hughes 
290 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 128. 
291 ld. at 133. 
292 ld. at 130-33. 
293 ld. at 107 (quoting Hand's remarks at a dinner of the New York Legal Aid Society 
in 1951). 
294 ld. at 121-22 (describing Hand's essay, Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the 
Eight-Hour Day, 21 HARv. L. REV. 495 (1908), which attacked the Court's trend to view due 
process as going beyond procedural proprieties and involving the substantive merits of the 
law). 
295 See, e.g., GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 274. 
296 ld. 
297 Id. at 275. 
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as Chief Justice rather than nominate then:Justice Stone to replace 
Taft and Hand to replace Stone. Hoover ultimately opted to appoint 
Hughes because of concerns raised by Taft that Stone and Hand 
would not have been sufficiently sympathetic to property rights.29S 
Gunther explains that Hand's last chance for appointment to the 
Court came in 1942, when Justice Frankfurter urged President 
Roosevelt to nominate Hand, then seventy years old, to replace Jimmy 
Byrnes. Gunther suggests three reasons for President Roosevelt's re-
fusal to nominate Hand: (1) Roosevelt was trapped by his "own 1937 
Court-packing plan, in which he had opposed septuagenerarians;"299 
(2) Roosevelt's patience with Frankfurter had grown thin;3oo and (3) 
Roosevelt did not want to strengthen Frankfurter's wing of the Court, 
which was resistant to judicial enforcement of noneconomic liberty 
claims. 301 Gunther implies another reason why Roosevelt did not 
nominate Hand: Roosevelt routinely named justices who had been 
loyal to him; Hand had no such record and in fact had publicly op-
posed Roosevelt's Court-packing plan.302 
B. The Biographies' Lasting Lessons for Judicial Selection 
This section considers whether these three biographies provide 
any useful guidance for future judicial selection. The three biogra-
phies shed light on two important aspects of judicial selection, particu-
larly the nomination of Supreme Court justices: the unpredictability 
of judicial greatness and the politicization of judicial selection. 
The first issue is whether these biographies reveal anything about 
how Justices Black and Powell and Judge Hand were chosen that ·will 
help to forecast which judicial nominees are likely to become great or 
influential judges. The books gloss over several factors that may hin-
der an accurate prediction of a judicial nominee's potential for great-
ness. These factors include a judge's lifespan, the kinds of cases a 
judge must decide and how he or she decides them, 303 and the nature 
298 Id. at 418-28. Gunther also tries to explain why President Hoover, who had consid-
ered Hand in 1930 when Chief Justice William Howard Taft retired, did not seriously con-
sider him just two years later to replace Justice Holmes. Gunther notes that Hoover 
nominated Justice Cardozo because Hoover wanted a common-law judge. The full expla-
nation is that President Hoover had even less control over this nomination than he had 
over the earlier one. In fact, the Senate strong-armed Hoover into naming Cardozo. It 
had concluded that the successor to Holmes, who had been a great common-law judge, 
should have a similar background. Id. at 428. 
299 ld. at 559. 
300 ld. at 561-62. 
301 Id. at 562-66. 
302 Id. at 458-60. 
303 For example, althoughJeffiies praises Justice Powell for helping to preserve affirm-
ative action, he neglects to note that this claim is clouded by the absence of a single major-
ity opinion on the constitutionality of affirmative action while Justice Powell was on the 
Court. See generally G. STONE ET AL., CoNsrrrUTIONAL LAw 617-49 (2d ed. 1991). 
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of a judge's interaction with his or her colleagues. For instance, one 
reason President Roosevelt replaced Justice Byrnes with Wiley Rut-
ledge,304 rather than Hand, was that Rutledge was forty-eight, while 
Hand was seventy. Ironically, Rutledge died six years after his ap-
pointment, and Hand outlived him by twelve years.305 The longer a 
judge lives, the more likely he or she will have the chance to shine or 
falter in mc:gor cases, as was true for Black, Powell, and Hand. 
It is also difficult to predict precisely how quickly the traits on 
which one bases judicial greatness will manifest themselves. Interest-
ingly, Black, Powell, and Hand each got off to relatively slow starts as 
judges.3o6 
Familiarity, notoriety, and public image also play key roles in pre-
dicting judicial greatness. For instance, at the time of his appoint-
ment to the Court, Black was generally regarded as an ardent New 
Deal liberal and Democrat;307 but no one-not even Roosevelt-gave 
much, if any, thought to how his populist upbringing, uncommon 
drive and intellect, and experiences as a county prosecutor, police 
court judge, highly successful trial and appellate lawyer, and senator 
(who had from 1928-1936 been an active member of the SenateJudi-
ciary Committee)3os would shape his performance on the Supreme 
Court. No one involved with his appointment predicted that Justice 
Black would have the most significant and lasting impact on constitu-
tional law of President Roosevelt's nine Supreme Court appointees. 
Part of the skepticism, no doubt, was attributable to the doubts Black's 
Klan membership raised about his commitment to civil rights.309 
Moreover, Black's contemporaries, such as Frankfurter, initially 
thought he lacked the requisite degree of "technical jurisdictional 
learning" to perform adequately on the Supreme Court.310 
Another critical lesson these biographies teach is that the role of 
politics in judicial selection-both in its grand sense of pursuing no-
ble and principled conceptions of the public good and civic duty311 or 
in its petty sense of partisan payback or maneuvering-is not a new 
304 See GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 568. 
305 Id. at 560-61. 
306 See id. at 135-39 (referring to Hand's letters to his mother confessing, inter alia, his 
anxieties about being a federal district judge); JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 334-35 (quoting 
Powell's acknowledgement upon first arriving on the Court that he was "woefully unpre-
pared" for the post); NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 272-74 (describing Black's adjustment to the 
Court and justice Stone's initial concerns that he was too brash). 
307 See NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 239. 
308 Id. at xiv. 
309 See id. at 24041. 
31 O Id. at 234 (citingJosErH P. LAsH, DEALERS AND DREAMERS: A NEw LooK AT THE NE\v 
DEAL 311 (1988)). 
311 See JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 554 (discussing Powell's reaction to the politizatiori of 
Bork's nomination). 
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phenomenon. Presidents Roosevelt and Nixon used a nominee's 
political record as a proxy for forecasting the nominee's predisposi-
tion and likely performance on the bench. Taft's and Roosevelt's fo-
cus on a nominee's judicial ideology as a potential disqualifying factor 
for Supreme Court appointment also reflects the rich heritage of such 
concerns in judicial selection. 
Indeed, nothing about the fates of Justices Black and Powell and 
Judge Hand in the judicial selection process is incompatible with a 
more sophisticated under~tanding of the political dynamics of the sys-
tem. For example, President Roosevelt nominated Black because 
Black had been a staunch political ally. At that time, Roosevelt failed 
to foresee that his Supreme Court appointees would eventually differ 
over the degree of deference that should be accorded governmental 
actions interfering with noneconomic liberty interests. By 1942, 
Roosevelt understood the nature of this division on the Court, and 
concluded that Hand's nomination would bolster the wrong ideologi-
cal wing of the Court.312 Roosevelt's decision was partisan in the sense 
that it comported with his desire not to reward Hand for opposing his 
Court-packing plan, but it also reflected his broader vision of the di-
rection in which he wanted the Court to move and his belief that a 
younger nominee would ensure that this movement would last for 
some time. Hand's failure to be appointed to the Supreme Court did 
not result from a flaw in the judicial selection system. Instead, his 
failure to secure a nomination was a result of bad timing and Hand's 
own political actions. Moreover, while Taft and Hand remained true 
to their respective visions of the role of the judiciary in our society, 
Hand was the victim of the collision between the two men's 
convictions. 
Nevertheless, the change in the kind of people nominated to 
judgeships, particularly to the Supreme Court, is striking. These judi-
cial biographies remind us that we have dramatically moved away from 
the practice of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, who together ap-
pointed thirteen justices, all but three of whom came to the Court 
directly from elected or appointed federal offices. Of the remaining 
three justices, Sherman Minton came from the Seventh Circuit, to 
which he had been appointed by President Roosevelt in 1940 shortly 
after losing his bid for reelection to the Senate. 313 Minton, who was 
appointed in 1949, was the last U.S. Senator to serve on the Court.314 
Earl Warren, nominated by President Eisenhower in 1953, was the last 
312 See GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 562-68. 
313 See NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 398. 
314 Minton was not the first choice for the position he eventually filled on the Court. 
Roosevelt had intended to nominated Judge Goodrich, but Roosevelt's death gave Truman 
the chance to name someone else. See id. at 338. 
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governor appointed to the bench.315 Since then, the only elected offi-
cial appointed to the Court has been Justice O'Connor, who served 
five years in the Arizona state senate.316 
Presidents Roosevelt and Truman regarded a Supreme Court 
nomination as the culmination of a life in public service. They be-
lieved that the more diverse experiences a nominee had with the law, 
the greater the nominee's insight into the Court's role in the constitu-
tional order. Roosevelt and Truman hoped that their Court appoin-
tees would, like Black, have a deep appreciation for the federal 
legislative process, separation of powers, and federalism. Roosevelt 
and Truman also believed-sometimes wrongly-that the Justices 
whom they appointed would appreciate the importance of collegiality, 
particularly when working with people of different viewpoints.317 
Roosevelt and Truman, however, did not fail to appreciate the differ-
ence between judging and legislating. They did not seek crass polit-
icos adept at compromise, skilled in vote trading, or bent on 
legislating from the bench. In fact, as Gunther reminds us, the New 
Deal liberals overwhelmingly favored judicial deference to federal and 
state policymaking on economic issues.318 Moreover, Truman's ap-
pointees-Vinson, Clark, Burton, and Minton-favored judicial re-
straint, adhered to precedent, and believed that the Court's function 
was to determine whether the Constitution granted the political 
branches the power to take certain actions or to adopt certain poli-
cies, not to judge the wisdom of these acts.319 
The increasing concern about the Court's activism has 
culminated in a higher level of public and Senate scrutiny of prospec-
tive Supreme Court nominees. Hence, it has become more difficult 
for a nominee to hide, as Black did, embarrassing personal informa-
tion. The price we pay for this closer scrutiny is that an outspoken 
judge, such as Learned Hand or Robert Bork, or a veteran politician, 
such as Bruce Babbitt or Mario Cuomo, is not likely to be nominated 
to the Court. During their careers, such individuals are likely to have 
made political enemies who will use the confirmation hearing as a 
chance to get even. In addition, the more things we expect a presi-
315 See id. at 426-27, 434. 
316 See JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 505. 
317 The biggest disappointment apparently was Frankfurter, whom both Gunther and 
Newman generally depict as having failed to realize his potential as a justice because his 
arrogance, petulance, and pettiness alienated virtually all of his colleagues. See GUNTHER, 
supra note 1, at 566; NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 470. 
318 See GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 562-66. 
319 See NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 338-39, 341-44, 345, 347-48, 397. To be sure, Tru-
man's appointees were not the best qualified. Even though Black had been close friends 
with Burton and Minton and had interceded more than once on behalf of Minton's ap-
pointment, see id. at 338-39, 398, Black later confessed that he was disappointed by them, 
see id. at 419. 
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dent to do while in office, the more difficult it is for him or her to risk 
political capital on a Supreme Court nominee. Consequently, it is 
more likely that the President will opt for the path of least resistance 
by naming a person with relatively few political foes. 
CONCLUSION 
The ideal judicial biographer should have many skills: he or she 
should possess a legal scholar's mastery of the fields in which the sub-
ject gained distinction; a historian's persistence and talent for finding, 
organizing, and elucidating facts; a psychologist's appreciation for 
personality development; and a biographer's empathy and even-
handedness. Gunther, Jeffries, and Newman all demonstrate more 
than one of these attributes. Gunther thoroughly canvasses Learned 
Hand's penchant for self-doubt and deftly describes the historical pe-
riods in which Hand lived and worked as a judge. Jeffries clearly de-
picts the personality conflicts and the exchanges that occurred 
between the Justices in many important cases in which Lewis Powell 
participated. Newman draws an extraordinarily well-balanced and 
documented portrait of Hugo Black as politician and judge. 
More than anything else, though, Gunther, Newman, and Jeffries 
personalize judicial decisionmaking in a way that conventional legal 
scholarship never could. In pulling the curtain back to expose these 
judges at work, they remind us that judges are first and foremost peo-
ple and that personality and background shape judicial outlook and 
achievements. They show further that judicial greatness is not predict-
able and depends a great deal on character, experience, colleagues, 
docket, and lifespan. They reveal that public ~ervice can shape judi-
cial insight and performance, and that a judge's political instincts 
help to provide the foundations for his or her judicial. philosophy. 
Moreover, they remind us that judicial service is a noble calling and 
that by constitutional design judicial selection is a sophisticated polit-
ical process. A president's choice of a judicial nominee, especially to 
the Supreme Court, is based on a complex balancing of various fac-
tors, including the President's popularity and relationship with the 
Senate and his or her appreciation of the nominee's political activities 
and an estimation of a nominee's likely impact on the Constitution, 
balance of powers, and federalism. These scholars remind us further 
that writing a judicial biography can reveal as much about the writer's 
attitude about the subject as it does about the subject. More impor-
tantly, they demonstrate just how inspiring, demanding, and special 
both living and copiously describing a distinguished judicial life can 
be. 
